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This dissertation is the collection of three papers on environmental and labor economics.  
The First chapter is on environmental economics. The main objective of this chapter is to explore 
the effect of local community pressure on the corporate environmental management effort 
expended by factories regulated under the Clean Water Act. Many factors influence corporate 
environmental management, which I interpret to include the full spectrum of pollution control 
techniques from reactive end-of-pipe treatment techniques to proactive pollution prevention 
protocols. The analysis of this chapter empirically exploits to two survey-based measures of local 
community pressure. One captures the perceived need to respond to local concerns over the natural 
environment. The other measure captures the economic importance of the polluting facility in the local 
community. These two measures capture countervailing forces. While the first reflects greater local 
environmental pressure, the second reflects less local environmental pressure. Our results reveal that 
local community pressure positively influences corporate environmental management in general; 
however, in certain cases, the two local dimensions reveal distinctions between a community’s desire 
for environmental protection and economic activity.  
The second chapter is also on environmental economics, which serves as an extension to 
the first chapter. Here, I explore the effect of spatially defined local community characteristics on 
the wastewater management environmental choice by constricting rings of community 
characteristics within 1,5,10 and 15 miles of the regulated facility location. The study includes not 
only economic characteristics of the community, but also socioeconomic, demographic and 
political community characteristic that serve as proxies of local community pressure. In addition, 
to empirically answer the question whether local communities promote water pollution control, 
this study assesses whether the communities are environmentally discriminated against on 
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demographic characteristics or social instability. Results reveal wealthier communities appear to 
induce facilities to increase their environmental efforts and improve wastewater management 
practices but this effort fades as the distance to the facility grows. 
The third chapter of this dissertation studies the effect of terrorist attacks on the labor 
market to provide empirical evidence on the economic consequences of terrorism on the labor 
supply. It Is a co-authoring work with William Duncan. We develop a set of hypotheses from 
classical labor economic theory around the consumer maximization problem and propose a 
threshold for endangerment costs that, when reached, causes individuals to choose not working 
and less consumption, rather than work and face the danger of terrorism and violence. As such, I 
hypothesize that increased endangerment costs lead to fewer people working, less hours worked 
per week, lower wages, and less job permanence. The importance of this kind of research cannot 
be understated, as the mechanisms through which terrorism impacts a society are still not clearly 
understood. Many studies of terrorism focus on more advanced countries (Eckstein and Tsiddon 
2004). But in Iraq, one of the major economic consequences of the conflict and subsequent terrorist 
activity has been the shocks to the labor supply.  In addition, understanding the impact of terrorist 
attacks on labor supply of countries under severe pressure from terrorism may provide future 
motivation for research into refugee crises and labor policies of destination countries. 
The main contribution of this chapter to the ongoing literature is study the effect of 
terrorism in Iraq on the labor supply, using several measures of the labor force: employment status, 
wages, hours worked per week and job permanence. Moreover, I generate a geospatial variable to 
incorporate potential spillover effects of terrorism. To do this, we use a nationwide household 
socio-economic survey conducted in 2007 by the Iraqi Organization for Statistics and Information 
Technology (COSIT), Kurdistan Regional Statistics Office (KRSO) and the World Bank. This data 
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was only recently released, and thus is largely unexplored. I generate two different data sets (panel 
and cross-sectional) based on both the Arabic and English version of the household socio-
economic survey. To the best of my knowledge, this might be the first study that empirically 
explores the economic consequences of terrorism on the labor market within a country that faced 
sequential terrorist attacks such as Iraq. Briefly, the preliminary results show strong evidence in 
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1  Effects of Local Community Pressure on Corporate Environmental Management  
1.1. Introduction 
Since the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970, 
environmental regulation in the United States has made major strides to control pollution. A 
primary example is the enactment of the Clean Water Act of 1972, which aims to regulate every 
pollutant or contaminant discharged from a point source of pollution into U.S. waters by requiring 
permits with discharge limits. These limits are only effective if regulated point sources, namely, 
industrial and municipal facilities, adhere to these limits. To ensure this adherence, regulatory 
agencies conduct inspections and take enforcement actions. The literature is rife with empirical 
analyses that examine the efficacy of such regulatory pressure across a wide range of 
environmental media and economic sectors (e.g., Gray and Deily, 1996; Laplante and Rilstone, 
1996; Helland, 1998a; Helland, 1998b; Earnhart, 2004a; Earnhart, 2004b). As important, much 
scholarship explores the role of non-regulatory pressure, such as local community pressure, for 
prompting efforts to reduce pollution. Similarly, policymakers share a deep interest in this non-
regulatory pressure. For example, the EPA promotes the use of other levers for inducing regulated 
polluters to constrain their emissions and discharges through better environmental management. 
In particular, the recent EPA Next Generation Compliance initiative, initiated under the Obama 
administration, is promoting roles for non-regulatory actors. As one prominent actor, the initiative 
is empowering local communities to pressure regulated facilities to constrain their pollution. 
Under the new presidential administration of Donald Trump, federal environmental policy is 
shifting toward environmental de-regulation. Some of these de-regulatory efforts relate to the 
Clean Water Act. Namely, the Trump administration wishes to scale back the scope of the Clean 
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Water Rule, also known as Waters of the United States.1 As part of this policy shift, traditional 
environmental regulatory pressure, exerted through inspections and enforcement, is expected to 
decline. When environmental regulatory pressure is weaker, if not absent, the importance of other 
channels to induce corporate environmental management, such as local community pressure, is 
greater. In essence, the decrease in regulatory pressure crowds-in local community pressure. Thus, 
local community pressure may play a bigger role under the Trump administration. 
Several previous studies explore the role of local community pressure on environmental 
management choices using either direct or indirect measures of local community pressure. Some 
studies craft direct measures of local community pressure from responses to surveys of regulated 
facilities (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996; Blackman and Bannister, 1998; Dasgupta et al., 2000; 
Da Motta, 2006). Other studies use community characteristics, e.g., per capita income, to serve as 
proxies of local community pressure (Becker, 2003; Earnhart, 2004b; Mexwell, 2000; Pargal and 
Wheeler, 1996; Pargal et al., 1997; Wolverton, 2009). 
This study contributes to the scholarly literature and the policy discussion on the role of non-
regulatory actors. Our study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it theoretically explores 
the impact of local community pressure on corporate environmental management while 
acknowledging the possibility that local pressure may crowd out pro-social intrinsic motivations 
on the part of facilities’ management personnel. Thus, the overall effect on corporate 
environmental management effort is ambiguous. Second, our study distinguishes between a local 
community’s concern over the natural environment and its concern for economic activity. 
                                                 
1  The Clean Water Rule is an environmental regulation that gives the federal government authority to limit pollution 
in major bodies of water, rivers, streams, and wetlands. It was issued under the Clean Water Act. This rule is designed 
to expand the federal government’s authority to regulate pollution in smaller streams and rivers that flow into larger 
bodies of water. 
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I explore the effect of local community pressure on the corporate environmental management 
effort expended by chemical manufacturing facilities regulated under the Clean Water Act. Similar 
to several previous studies, we use a survey to generate self-reported, subjective measures of local 
community pressure. One survey question asks facility managers to assess their facilities’ need to 
respond to the local communities’ environmental concerns. A separate question asks facility 
managers to depict their facilities’ economic importance for the local community. Our analysis 
explores the effects of these two local community factors on several important dimensions of 
corporate environmental management: environmental labor (quantity of environmental engineers), 
environmental capital (wastewater treatment technologies), and environmental protocols (self-
audits). Our results reveal that local community pressure positively influences corporate 
environmental management in general; however, in certain cases, the two local dimensions reveal 
distinctions between a community’s desire for environmental protection and economic activity. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 
constructs a theoretical framework, which generates testable hypotheses. Section 4 describes the 
econometric framework. Section 5 discusses the data and provides summary statistics. Section 6 
details the econometric analysis and reports the empirical results, while interpreting them as a 
means for testing theoretically derived hypotheses. Section 7 concludes and assesses briefly future 
research. 
1.2. Literature Review 
Much empirical analysis explores the effect of local community pressure on corporate 
environmental management or environmental performance. Within this literature, we distinguish 
between (1) studies that explore the role of local community pressure using survey-based 
measures, which reflect a type of direct measure, and (2) studies that explore the role of local 
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community pressure using local community characteristics as proxies, which represent indirect 
measures. These proxies are appropriate under the assumption that local community pressure is 
correlated with the key community characteristics. For example, wealthier communities engage in 
more efforts to pressure locally regulated sources to reduce their pollution as a means of improving 
local environmental quality because environmental quality is a normal good (Earnhart, 2004b). 
1.2.1. Direct Measures of Local Community Pressure 
Some studies analyze the effect of local community pressure using direct measures derived 
from survey data. Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) use a survey to collect data on Canada’s 750 
largest firms to assess why firms formulate official plans for handling environmental issues. To 
measure local community pressure, Canadian firms were asked to rate the importance of public 
pressure on their company from a scale of 1 to 7. The study provides evidence that local community 
pressure positively influences a firm’s decision to formulate an environmental plan. 
To identify the principal determinants of a firm’s decision to adopt a clean technology, 
Blackman and Bannister (1998) survey owners or managers of 95 traditional brick companies in 
Juarez, Mexico. The study uses a dichotomous variable indicating whether a firm has membership 
in an Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) local organization. Results reveal that local 
community pressure promotes the adoption of a clean technology. 
Dasgupta et al. (2000) explores the effect of self-reported local community pressure on the 
environmental performance of polluters using World Bank survey data on Mexican manufacturers 
operating in four sectors: food, chemicals, nonmetallic minerals, and metals. The survey gathers 
detailed data on regulatory compliance, formal regulation, and local community pressure, as 
measured by responses to key survey questions. Empirical results show that local community does 
not significantly affect the environmental performance of the studied facilities. 
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Gangadharan (2006) uses the same World Bank survey data to study the influence of local 
community pressure on the probability of a firm complying with environmental 
regulations. Empirical results indicate that local community pressure substantially influences the 
likelihood of a firm’s over-compliance; however, the magnitude of its impact is not large. 
Da Motta (2006) utilizes a survey of large Brazilian plants from 1997 to analyze the 
facilities’ environmental performance. The analysis includes several variables that reflect local 
community pressure. The study concludes that local community pressure and NGO pressure are 
the two main factors explaining corporate environmental performance. 
1.2.2. Indirect Measures of Local Community Pressure 
Other studies explore the effect of local community pressure on corporate environmental 
management or performance using demographic or socioeconomic characteristics of the local 
community, which serve as proxies or indirect measures of local community pressure. 
One of the most common economic characteristics used to measure local community 
pressure is income. Some analyses use median household income (Arora and Cason, 1999; Brooks 
and Sethi, 1997; Hamilton, 1993). Other studies use per capita income (Becker, 2003; Earnhart, 
2004b; Maxwell et al., 2000; Pargal and Wheeler, 1996; Pargal et al., 1997; Wolverton, 2009). 
Most of these studies conclude that greater pressure as proxied by higher community income leads 
to better environmental performance from facilities located in the community. 
Few empirical studies analyze the effect of age (Arora and Cason, 1999; Pargal et al., 1997; 
Pargal and Wheeler, 1996). These results reveal no significant effect. 
Several empirical analyses assess the effect of local community population. Some of these 
studies use total population to capture this effect (Arora and Cason, 1999; Wolverton, 2009). Other 
studies use population density (Becker, 2003; Brooks and Sethi, 1997; Dasgupta, 2002; Earnhart, 
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2004b; Hamilton, 1993; Maxwell et al., 2000; Pargal et al., 1997; Pargal and Wheeler, 1996). One 
study measures only a community’s sensitive population, which is the percent of population under 
five years or over 64 years of age (Becker, 2003). Arora and Cason (1999) find that total population 
influences corporate environmental performance in only a sub-sample of their study. Similarly, 
Wolverton (2009) reveals a positive effect only in certain econometric specifications. Pargal et al. 
(1997), Becker (2003), and Earnhart (2004b) demonstrate positive effects of population destiny on 
corporate environmental performance. In contrast, Pargal and Wheeler (1996) reveal a negative 
effect of population density on corporate environmental performance. Brooks and Sethi (1997) 
find that greater population density leads to more toxic releases in a given local community. 
Some empirical studies use community educational attainment as proxy for a community’s 
intellectual sophistication generally or environmental sophistication specifically (e.g., Pargal and 
Wheeler, 1996). One study uses the percentage of adults with four or more years of college to 
capture educational attainment (Hamilton, 1993). Similarly, some studies use the percentage of 
people aged 25 years or more with at least a bachelor’s degree (Brooks and Sethi, 1997; Arora and 
Cason, 1999; Maxwell et al., 2000; Becker, 2003). Other studies use the high school graduation 
rate or percentage of local residents with at least a high school diploma (Earnhart , 2004b; 
Wolverton, 2009). Pargal and Wheeler, 1996 finds that communities with high level of education 
gives high weight to water pollution. Brooks and Sethi (1997) demonstrate that educational 
attainment is significantly and negatively related to exposure to air pollution. Similarly, Arora and 
Cason (1999) find that people aged 25 years or more with at least a bachelor’s degree are 
significantly and negatively affect the toxics release inventory in most of the U.S. regions. In 
contrast, Becker (2003) shows that educational attainment have statistically zero effects on air 
pollution abatement (APA) expenditure by U.S manufacturing plants.   
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 Several empirical studies explore the effect of local unemployment on corporate 
environmental management or performance (Pargal and Wheeler 1996; Pargal et al., 1997; Becker, 
2003; Earnhart, 2004b; Arora and Cason, 1999). Becker (2003) finds that the unemployment rate 
has zero statistical effects on the APA operating cost per dollar of output. Earnhart (2004b) shows 
that the unemployment rate negatively affects corporate environmental performance. 
Other studies analyze the percentage of workers employed in manufacturing sectors as 
means for evaluating workers’ trade-offs between employment and the natural environment 
(Brooks and Sethi, 1997; Wolverton, 2009; Arora and Cason, 1999). Brooks and Sethi (1997) find 
that the proportion of workers in manufacturing positively affects the toxic pollutants released in 
a given local community. Similarly, Wolverton (2009) shows that the proportion of workers in 
manufacturing positively affects the siting of a polluting facility in a given community. 
To capture a community’s propensity to engage in political or collective action, some 
empirical studies examine the effect of voter turnout in presidential elections (Hamilton, 1993; 
Arora and Cason, 1999; Becker 2003; Wolverton, 2009; Brooks and Sethi, 1997; Earnhart, 2004b). 
Hamilton (1993) finds that, as a community’s voter turnout grows, a polluting firm is less likely 
to expand into the particular community. Similarly, Brooks and Sethi (1997) reveal that voter 
turnout negatively affects the amount of toxic releases in a given community. In contrast, Becker 
(2003) shows that voter turnout negatively affects pollution abatement operating cost per dollar of 
output. Earnhart (2004b) finds no significant impact of voter turnout on corporate environmental 
performance.2 
Our study contributes to this literature in two ways. First, it theoretically explores the 
impact of local community pressure on corporate environmental management while 
                                                 
2 Our study also contributes to a robust literature exploring the effects of various factors on corporate environmental 
management (e.g., Earnhart and Leonard, 2013). 
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acknowledging the possibility that local pressure may crowd out pro-social intrinsic motivations 
on the part of facilities’ management personnel. Second, our study empirically distinguishes 
between a local community’s concern over the natural environment and its desire for economic 
activity using direct measures of these two dimensions. 
1.3. Regulatory Context 
1.3.1. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
This study examines environmental management offered by polluting facilities regulated 
under the U.S. Clean Water Act. One of the Act’s main purposes is to protect water quality by 
controlling wastewater discharges from point sources. To this end, the EPA created the National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) to control these point source discharges. The 
system’s main form of control is the issuance of facility-specific permits, which identify the 
pollutant-specific discharge limits imposed on regulated facilities. Permits are issued and re-issued 
generally on a 5-year cycle by the EPA or authorized state agencies. (As noted below, state 
agencies can obtain the authority to share in the implementation of the NPDES system, including 
the authority to issue permits, conduct inspections, and take enforcement actions.) 
When establishing discharge limits within individual facilities’ permits, the issuing agency 
considers the relevant Effluent Limitation Guideline standard, which is designed to require a 
minimum level of wastewater treatment for a given industry, and the state water quality-based 
standard, which is designed to ensure that the water body receiving the discharges meets state-
based ambient surface water quality standards. After a candidate discharge limit is determined 
under each standard, the more stringent limit is written into the permit. Each permitted discharge 
limit represents a performance-based standard under which compliance is based solely on the 
regulated facility’s discharges. Thus, a facility may use any available abatement method to comply 
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with its permitted limits. A myriad of abatement methods is available to facilities: end-of-pipe 
treatment equipment (i.e., physical capital), deployment of labor, and other methods (e.g., self-
audits).3 
In the NPDES system, permitted facilities are required to monitor and self-report their 
discharges on a regular basis. Thus, inspections are not needed to assess compliance with imposed 
discharge limits. Moreover, since permitted limits constrain discharges over an entire month (or 
longer), individual inspections are not able to assess compliance with discharge limits. 
To ensure compliance with issued permits, the EPA and authorized state agencies 
periodically inspect facilities and take enforcement actions as needed. Inspections represent the 
backbone of environmental agencies’ efforts to monitor compliance and collect evidence for 
enforcement (Wasserman, 1984); inspections also maintain a regulatory presence (EPA, 1990). 
Agencies use a mixture of informal enforcement actions (e.g., warning letters) and formal 
enforcement actions, which include penalties (i.e., fines). 
Both the EPA and nearly all state agencies possess the authority to issue permits, inspect 
NPDES facilities, and take enforcement actions against non-compliant facilities. For state 
agencies, this authority is called “primacy”. To obtain approval for NPDES primacy, a state agency 
must demonstrate the regulatory capacity to administer the NPDES program. In particular, state 
agencies must possess an arsenal of monitoring and enforcement tools similar to the EPA in order 
to obtain primacy (Earnhart and Glicksman, 2011).4 While the EPA retains authority to monitor 
and impose sanctions on regulated facilities in all states, regardless of primacy, authorized state 
                                                 
3 The deployment of labor enhances the effectiveness of all types of equipment and other abatement methods. 
Wastewater engineers monitor, maintain, and operate treatment equipment; implement self-auditing protocols, 
administer internal monitoring systems, and undertake other environmental management practices. 




regulatory agencies are primarily responsible for monitoring and enforcement. For regulated 
facilities operating in states without NPDES primacy, EPA regional offices are fully responsible 
for monitoring and enforcement. For regulated facilities operating in states with primacy, EPA 
regional offices generally conduct inspections and take enforcement actions when state agencies 
fail to intervene or when federal pressure may be needed for inducing compliance, e.g., repeat 
offenders, recalcitrant facilities (Earnhart, 2004a). 
Clearly regulatory agencies play a critical role in prompting regulated facilities to engage 
in environmental management in order to control their wastewater discharges. However, additional 
agents exert pressure on regulated facilities, such as stockholders, insurance providers, and labor 
unions. This study focuses on the pressure exerted by local communities. 
1.3.2. Chemical Manufacturing Sector 
The Clean Water Act principally constrains wastewater discharges from point sources, 
which divide into two categories: municipal sources (i.e., municipal wastewater treatment 
facilities) and industrial sources. This study focuses on a single sector within the category of 
industrial sources: chemical manufacturing facilities. Figure 1 maps all regulated chemical 
manufacturing facilities operating in the United States. Our study’s focus on a single sector is 
consistent with other empirical studies of industrial pollution (e.g., Laplante and Rilstone, 1996; 
Barla, 2007; Earnhart, 2009; Earnhart and Harrington, 2014). 
The chemical manufacturing sector proves an excellent choice for analyzing the effects of 
government interventions on environmental labor. First, the EPA has shown a strong interest in 
this sector as evidenced by its study, jointly authored with the Chemical Manufacturing 
Association (CMA), on the root causes of non-compliance in this sector (EPA, 1999) and its own 
study on the compliance history for chemical manufacturers (EPA, 1997). Consistent with this 
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interest, two sub-sectors in the industry, industrial organics and chemical preparations, were 
regarded by the EPA as priority sectors during a portion of the study period. Further, the CMA 
(now known as the American Chemistry Council [ACC]) has demonstrated a strong interest in 
promoting pollution reduction and prevention with its Responsible Care initiative. The chemical 
manufacturing sector also generates a large amount of wastewater; as evidence, data on wastewater 
discharged in 2008 that are disaggregated by 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code 
reveal that four of the 10 most polluting sub-sectors operate in the chemical manufacturing sector 
(EPA, 2011). Finally, facilities in this sector devote substantial labor to environmental 
management. The average facility in our sample has a ratio of environmental employment to total 
employment of 0.046. Chemical manufacturing facilities also allocate many resources into 
environmental capital equipment and conduct several self-audits; see Earnhart and Leonard (2013) 
for details. 
Figure 1.1 














1.4. Conceptual Framework 
This section sketches a conceptual framework from which we derive testable hypotheses. An 
individual firm regulated under the Clean Water Act faces local community pressure to engage in 
environmental management in order to improve the local environment.5 In each period, the firm’s 
manager chooses the firm's level of environmental management, as measured by the amount of 
environmental labor (e.g., engineers)6, the amount of environmental capital (i.e., installation of 
wastewater treatment equipment), and the extent of environmental protocols (e.g., self-audits). The 
firm generates gross profits, incurs environmental management costs (e.g., salaries of 
environmental engineers), and faces costs imposed by external regulatory and non-regulatory 
actors stemming from poor corporate environmental management. For example, the firm faces 
penalties imposed by the regulatory agency for failing to comply with environmental protection 
laws. The firm’s net profits equal gross profits less the sum of environmental management costs 
and external environmental costs. 
As the focus of our study, the firm’s local community “penalizes” the firm by increasing its 
production costs and/or decreasing its revenues. Since local workers do not wish to work for a firm 
that is harangued by local citizens, the firm faces higher labor costs when the firm engages in 
weaker environmental management. Since customers do not wish to buy a product from a firm that 
is criticized by local citizens, the firm faces lower revenues when the firm exerts weaker 
environmental effort. 
Within this context, the net profit-maximizing firm chooses the environmental management 
level that minimizes all environmentally related costs. To achieve this minimum, the firm balances 
                                                 
5 The theoretical analysis assumes that each firm owns a single facility, so no difference exists between the firm and 
facility. 
6 Compatible with the literature (Raff and Earnhart, (2018)). 
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its marginal environmental management costs, representing the marginal abatement costs, against 
its marginal external environmental costs. Alternatively, we can view the reduction of external 
environmental costs as the benefits of environmental management. In this case, the net profit-
maximizing firm seeks to equate the marginal costs and benefits of environmental management. 
As local community pressure rises, the marginal benefits of environmental management grow. 
Thus, in response to greater local pressure, the firm chooses a higher level of environmental 
management. We label this connection as the “benefit effect”. 
However, external pressure may generate a countervailing force. An influential body of 
literature explores how pro-social motivations influence regulated behavior. This literature 
demonstrates that monetary incentives or disincentives stemming from regulatory pressure may 
“crowd out” intrinsic motivations to behave pro-socially, such as protecting the environment (Fehr 
and Falk, 2002; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Brekke et al., 2003; Bowles and Polinia-Reyes, 2012). This 
literature also reveals that these monetary incentives or disincentives may “crowd out” reputational 
motivations (Benabou and Tirole, 2006). In both cases, the “crowding out” effect undermines the 
effectiveness of greater regulatory pressure. Similarly, increased local community pressures may 
crowd out pro-social motivations. Under certain conditions, the crowding out effect may even 
dominate so that greater local community pressure leads to counter-productive results (e.g., 
Benabou and Tirole, 2006). 
Considering all of the forces identified above, we derive a pair of competing hypotheses:  
Hypothesis H1: If greater local community pressure fails to crowd out pro-social 
motivations or this crowding out effect is sufficiently small, then local community 
pressure positively affects the level of corporate environmental management 
(Hypothesis H1a). If the crowding out effect is sufficiently large so that the 
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crowding out effect dominates the benefit effect, then local community pressure 
negatively affects the level of corporate environmental management (Hypothesis 
H1b). 
Our empirical analysis tests this pair of hypotheses. 
1.5. Econometric Framework 
1.5.1. Dependent Variables and Primary Regressors  
In each year t, facility i chooses its level of environmental management, denoted as Yit, 
which represents the amounts of labor, capital, or protocol devoted to environmental management: 
(1) Environmental employees as a ratio of overall employees at a given facility; 
(2) Environmental capital to treat biological oxygen demand or total suspended solids; 
(3) Annual count of self-audits. 
Thus, our econometric analysis explores three types of dependent variables. It estimates the 
relationship between each of the four identified dependent variables and a set of primary regressors 
and control factors, as described below. 
The two primary regressors represent direct measures of local community pressure draw from 
a survey, as described in Section 5. One measure reflects a facility’s subjective assessment of the 
facility’s need to respond to local community concerns about the natural environment. The other 
measure reflects the facility’s self-reported assessment of its contribution to the local economy in 
terms of jobs, taxes, etc. As the facility’s economic impact grows, we expect a local community 
to reduce its pressure for better environmental management, fearing that the facility may shift part 
of its production to other sites or leave town altogether. Thus, economic impact is negatively 




1.5.2. Control Factors 
The econometric analysis controls for variation in other explanatory variables. To control for 
facility characteristics, the analysis includes the following factors. First, industrial sub-sector 
indicators control for variation in facilities’ abilities to control their operations based on the type 
of product being manufactured. The analysis includes two sub-sectoral indicators: organic 
chemical indicator and inorganic chemical indicator, with “other chemicals” as the omitted 
category.  
Second, environmental management, especially the number of environmental employees, may 
depend on the size of the regulated facility. The analysis measures facility size using two proxies: 
the number of facility employees and the NPDES facility classification. For the latter, the analysis 
includes a “major facility” indicator, with “minor facility” as the omitted category. 
 Third, the analysis controls for facility age. As a facility ages, the facility may need to expend 
greater effort to generate the same level of environmental performance, e.g., compliance with 
environmental protection laws. 
To control for the pressure exerted by regulatory agencies, the econometric analysis includes 
factors measuring the government interventions undertaken by state agencies and EPA regional 
offices. Our analysis considers different types and categories of government interventions. It 
considers two types of inspections: federal and state. Similarly, our analysis considers two forms 
of enforcement: informal actions and formal actions. As important, our econometric analysis 
considers two categories of government interventions: (1) government interventions against one's 
own facility, and (2) government interventions against all other facilities that are similar to one’s 
own. These two categories influence how each facility forms expectations about enforcement 
before the facility selects its level of environmental management. Our econometric analysis 
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assumes that each facility bases its expectations of future enforcement on the experiences of other 
similar facilities along with its own recent experiences (Shimshack and Ward, 2005; Earnhart, 
2004a,b,c; Earnhart, 2009). General deterrence reflects the ex ante general “threat” of future 
punishment based on the recent experiences of other facilities with regulatory interventions (Sah, 
1991; Cohen, 2000; Thornton et al., 2005; Shimshack and Ward, 2005; Shimshack and Ward, 
2008, Gray and Shadbegian, 2007). Specific deterrence adjusts this general threat based on the 
specific enforcement experiences of particular facilities in the recent past (Cohen, 2000; Earnhart 
and Friesen, 2013). 
   Our econometric analysis includes both general and specific deterrence measures as control 
factors. Consider first inspections. For specific deterrence, our analysis generates two measures to 
capture the number of federal inspections and state inspections conducted in the 24 months 
preceding the current year at the individual facility. For general deterrence, our analysis generates 
two measures to capture the number of federal inspections and state inspections conducted in the 
12 months preceding the current year at other facilities of similar size (based on the distinction 
between major and minor facilities) operating in the same EPA region, in the case of federal 
inspections, and in the same state, in the case of state inspections. For comparability across space 
and over time, we divide these regional or state-specific counts by the number of other similarly 
sized facilities operating in the same EPA region or state (Earnhart and Leonard, 2013). Since a 
facility needs time to learn about and respond to inspections conducted at other regulated facilities, 
we lag these general deterrence measures by one year. (For example, the state inspection-related 
general deterrence measure for a major facility operating in 2001 captures inspections conducted 
by the state agency at other major facilities operating in the same state during the year of 1999.) 
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Similarly, specific and general deterrence measures capture informal and formal enforcement 
actions. 
Finally, the analysis controls for variation in regulatory pressure not already reflected in the 
government intervention measures by including EPA regional indicators and year-specific 
indicators. 
 The next section describes the data used to estimate the functional relationship between 
each dependent variable reflecting the extent of environmental management effort and the 
explanatory variables identified above. 
1.6. Data 
1.6.1. Sources  
Our empirical analysis exploits information gathered from two different data sources. 
First, our study exploits data collected using an original survey of regulated facilities 
operating in the chemical manufacturing industry; see Earnhart and Glicksman (2011) for details. 
The survey consists of a number of confidential questions that gather data on environmental 
management practices undertaken by individual facilities. In particular, the survey gathers data on 
the amount of labor devoted to environmental management, measured in person-months. The 
specific survey question inquires “how many person-months of time did your facility allocate to 
help ensure that the facility met environmental regulations”; thus, this survey question secures data 
on personnel dedicated to environmental management. The survey contains data on environmental 
labor for the years 1999, 2000, and 2001.7 
                                                 
7 For this survey, we asked facilities to provide data on employment for each calendar year separately. Facilities were 
able to draw upon employment records when answering our survey questions on employment. As part of our 
implementation of the survey, we encouraged facilities to gather these records prior to the phone conversation when 
we recorded responses. Moreover, we facilitated this gathering of records by sending copies of the survey questions 
before the phone conversation. 
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Two separate survey questions gather data on environmental capital. One question inquires 
whether or not the facility operates capital equipment to treat biological oxygen demand. A similar 
question inquires whether the facility operates capital equipment to treat total suspended solids. 
These survey questions gather information about current operations. Guided by the insight of 
wastewater engineers, we assume these data reflect conditions for the 12 months preceding a 
facility’s completion of our survey. (This assumption is only meaningful for constructing the 
specific and general deterrence measures of government interventions.) 
One more survey question asks facilities to register the number of self-audits conducted 
annually over the period 1999 to 2001.8 
Collectively, we possess panel data for environmental employment and self-audits and 
cross-sectional data for environmental capital. 
The survey also offers self-reported measures of local community pressure. One measure 
captures local environmental concerns using this specific survey question: “Which of the following 
best describes the attitude that managers of your facility have towards the facility’s need to respond 
to local community concerns about the environment?”. Survey respondents chose from five 
categories: “little concern about the need to respond “, “some concern”, “quite a bit of concern”, 
and “a great deal of concern”. We create an indicator that captures the two higher categories (“quite 
bit of concern” and “great deal of concern”), with the two lower categories (“little of” and “some”) 
as the omitted category. 
The other measure of local community pressure captures the facility’s economic impact on the 
surrounding community. The specific survey question follows: “In your view, to what degree does 
                                                 
8 The survey asked facilities to provide data on self-audits for each calendar year separately. Facilities were able to 
draw upon records when answering our survey questions on audits. As part of our implementation of the survey, we 
encouraged facilities to gather these records prior to the phone conversation when we recorded responses. Moreover, 
we facilitated this gathering of records by sending copies of the survey questions before the phone conversation. 
19 
 
your facility contribute to the local economy, relative to other local businesses, in terms of jobs, 
taxes, and the like?” Survey respondents chose from four categories: “very little”, “small amount”, 
“significant amount”, and “great deal”. We create an indicator that captures the two higher 
categories (“significant” and “great”), with the two lower categories (“small” and “very little”) as 
the omitted category. 
In addition to data on our dependent variables and primary regressors, the survey gathers 
information on facility characteristics (e.g., facility age) and characteristics of the firms owning 
the facilities (e.g., ownership structure). 
To implement the survey, Earnhart and Glicksman (2011) and collaborators identified the 
proper population based on a full extract drawn from the EPA Permit Compliance System (PCS) 
database, which records information on facilities permitted within the NPDES system, as of 
September 2001; this extract included 2,596 chemical facilities. To remain in the survey 
population, facilities needed to meet the following criteria: (1) possessed an NPDES permit, (2) 
faced restrictions on their wastewater discharges, (3) discharged regulated pollutants into surface 
water bodies, and (4) were operating as of 2002. Application of these criteria identified 1,003 
facilities to contact. Of those facilities contacted between April of 2002 and March of 2003, 268 
facilities completed the survey, implying a 27 % response rate. This rate is comparable to previous 
large-scale surveys of industrial sectors (e.g., Arimura et al., 2008) and lies above the average 
response rate of 21 % as identified by a review of 183 published studies based on business surveys 
(Paxson, 1992). 
Given the survey’s non-response rate of 73 %, the potential for sample selection bias is a 
valid concern. We assess this concern in two ways. First, we compare the original sample of 1,003 
potentially eligible facilities to the 268 facilities that completed the survey. Based on this 
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comparison, we find no systematic state or regional bias in survey participation. As examples, only 
the Midwest region is slightly over-represented in the response group and only the Northeast 
region is slightly under-represented. However, these differences are small. Moreover, across most 
of the states, the difference between representation in the original sample and representation in the 
response group averages less than 2 %. In contrast, our assessment reveals some difference in the 
participation of major facilities versus minor facilities. In the original sample, 69 % of facilities 
are minor facilities and 31 % are major facilities. In the group of survey respondents, major 
facilities are slightly over-represented at 39 %, a statistically significant difference. 
As a stronger assessment, we test for sample selection bias by assessing whether any 
relevant factors appear to affect a facility’s decision to complete our survey once it is contacted. 
We use a probit model to estimate the relationship between the binary decision to complete or not 
complete our survey and a set of relevant factors, including major versus minor status, recent 
experience with inspections and enforcement actions, and EPA region. The probit estimation 
results (available upon request) reveal bias in a single dimension: major facilities were more likely 
to respond to the survey than were minor facilities. Given this difference, we would need to 
interpret cautiously the coefficient on the major facility indicator in our regression results.9 
For these reasons, our study does not correct for any potential sample selection bias. This 
lack of correction is consistent with recent published studies of environmental management 
practices (e.g., Anton et al., 2004; Arimura et al., 2008). 
                                                 
9 We acknowledge that major facilities may respond to local community pressure differently than minor facilities. We 
would be able to capture these differences by interacting the major indicator with the local community pressure 
measures. In this case, our selection bias would contaminate the interaction terms, prompting us to interpret these 
interactions cautiously as well. However, we do not include these interactions. Thus, the selection bias does not disrupt 
any additional interpretation. 
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To complement these survey data, our study also collected data from the EPA PCS database 
on each facility's location, NPDES major or minor classification, and four-digit standard industrial 
classification (SIC) code. The PCS database also provides data on inspections conducted by federal 
and state regulators. The PCS database and the EPA Docket database provide data on federal 
enforcement actions.  
1.6.2. Statistical Summary 
Table 1.1 provides summary statistics for the dependent variables, primary regressors, and 
control factors. As shown in Table 1.1, the ratio of environmental employees to overall employees 
is about 0.05. Of the sampled facilities, roughly 58 % operate capital equipment to treat BOD and  
Table 1.1 
Descriptive Statistics  
 




Ratio of Environmental Employees to Overall Employees 746 74.73 178.93 
Capital Treatment Cap :     
Use of Biochemical Oxygen Demand treatment (BOD) 254 0.582 0.494 
Use of Total Suspended Solids Treatment TSS  252 0.690 0.463 
Self-audit  705 5.947 12.764 
Primary Regressors  
Environmental concerns of the local community  765 0.874 0.331 
The Economic Impact of the facility 777 0.710 0.453 
Control Factors   
EPA region  804 4.641 1.821 
Year  804 2000 0.817 
Facility age  780 42.188 24.530 
Number of facility employees  781 259.926 480.9 
Organic facility  804 0.435 0.496 
Inorganic facility  804 0.309 0.462 
Major facility 804 0.384 0.486 
 
69 % operate capital equipment to treat TSS. The average facility conducts six self-audits annually. 
While this average may seem high, it reflects a skewed distribution since 15 % of the sampled 
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facilities do not conduct a self-audit in a given calendar year. Of the sampled facilities, 87 % felt 
a higher need to respond to local environmental concerns and 71 % generated a higher impact on 
the local economy. 
1.7. Econometric Analysis 
1.7.1. Estimation Techniques 
For our analysis, we adopt different estimation techniques to address the variety of data. First, to 
accommodate and exploit the panel data, the empirical analysis employs standard panel data 
estimation techniques using the following equation:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡 + η𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝐿𝑖 + 𝜇𝐷𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡    … (1) 
where: α is the intercept term, 𝛽𝑖 are the slope coefficients, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 the set of primary regressors, 
𝐹𝑖𝑡 facility characteristics controls, 𝐺𝑖𝑡 government interventions controls, 𝐿𝑖 regional indicators, 
𝐷𝑡  year indictors and 𝑖𝑡 is an error term.  
For the cross-sectional data, the analysis employs the following equation  
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖 + η𝐹𝑖 + 𝛿𝐺𝑖 + 𝜃𝐿𝑖 + 𝑖   … (2) 
Where: α is the intercept term, 𝛽𝑖 are the slope coefficients, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 the set of primary regressors, 𝐹𝑖 
facility characteristics controls, 𝐺𝑖 government interventions controls, 𝐿𝑖 regional indicators, and 
𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 
The measures of local community pressure do not vary over time. For this reason, the panel 
data analysis focuses on pooled OLS, which generates at least consistent estimates for time-
invariant factors, and random effects estimation, which is consistent under certain conditions.  
The environmental employment measure captures a continuous dependent variable so 
standard estimators are sufficient. However, the environmental capital measures are binary 
dependent variables spanned by a cross-sectional data, reflecting the presence of absence of any 
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treatment equipment for a particular pollutant: BOD or TSS. Following the literature, we 
implement both a linear probability model and a Probit estimator to explore these binary outcomes. 
The environmental self-audit dependent variable reflects count data. We implement a negative 
binomial model to estimate this count measure. 
To assess the robustness of our results, the empirical analysis uses four different regressor 
sets (i.e., models), which vary based on the inclusion of control factors. The first regressor set is 
the parsimonious model (Model 1), which excludes all control factors. The second set adds year 
and regional indicators (Model 2). The third set adds facility characteristics (Model 3). The full set 
includes all the control factors (Model 4). The next sub-section primarily uses the full model 
estimates to interpret the empirical results. The econometric analysis clusters standard errors at the 
facility level when analyzing the panel data. 
1.7.2. Empirical Results  
1.7.2.1. Ratio of Environmental Employees to Overall Facility Employees 
Table 1.2 displays the results from the pooled OLS regression and random effects 
estimation of the ratio of environmental employees to overall facility employees. Regardless of 
the estimator, the results indicate that both local community factors significantly affect the 
environmental employee ratio. If a facility feels a stronger need to respond to local environmental 
concerns, the facility employs a greater proportion of environmental employees. If a facility’s 
economic impact increases, then the facility reduces its proportion of environmental employees. 
These results reveal that both local community factors appear to push local community pressure 
in the same direction. 
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Collectively, these results support Hypothesis H1a. As local community pressure rises, 
facilities increase their environmental management efforts by hiring more environmental 
employees (as a proportion of overall employees). 
Table 1.2.1 
Pooled OLS esiomation of Dierct Local Ccommunity Pressure on the Facility ‘s Ratio of 
Enviermental Employees to Overall Employees  






Environmental concerns of the local 
community  
 
0.0526*** 0.0488*** 0.0524*** 0.0539*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
The Economic impact of the facility -0.0507*** -0.0390*** -0.0417*** -0.0417*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Controal Factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations  705 705 690 689 
R-squared  0.037 0.147 0.174 0.198 




Random Effects  Esiomation of Direct Local Ccommunity Pressure on the Facility ‘s Ratio 
of Enviermental Employees to Overall Employees  








Environmental concerns of the local 
community  
 
0.0503*** 0.0466** 0.0507*** 0.0506*** 
(0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009) 
The Economic impact of the facility -0.0495* -0.0381* -0.0399* -0.0401* 
(0.064) (0.065) (0.090) (0.091) 
Controal Factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations  705 705 690 689 
-Robust p-value in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
1.7.2.2. Presence of Environmental Capital 
      Using the cross-sectional data, we estimate a facility’s choice to install environmental capital,  
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namely, equipment designed to treat one of two wastewater pollutants: Biochemical Oxygen 
Demand (BOD) and Total Suspended Solids (TSS). Table 1.3.2 displays the results for BOD 
treatment capital. Tables 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 display the linear probability model and Probit estimates, 
respectively. Table1.4.1 displays the results for TSS treatment capital. Tables 4.a and 4.b display 
the linear probability model and Probit estimates, respectively. 
We first interpret the BOD capital-related results shown in Table 1.3.1 If a facility feels a 
greater need to respond to local environmental concerns, the facility is more likely to install BOD 
treatment capital. However, this positive effect is statistically significant only in the Models 1 and 
2 estimates. Once we control for facility characteristics, the effect becomes insignificant. Thus, 
our conclusion is not robust across the regressor sets. These results only weakly support 
Hypothesis H1a. 
Table 1.3.1 
Liner Probablity Esiomation of Dierct Local Community Pressure on the Facility  Use of 










Environmental concerns of the 
local community  
 
0.136 0.114 0.0728 0.0757 
(0.143) (0.234) (0.439) (0.431) 
The Economic impact of the 
facility 
0.160** 0.138* 0.0578 0.0585 
(0.025) (0.067) (0.455) (0.456) 
Contral Factors  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions(*)  No No No Yes 
Observations 248 248 238 238 
R-squared 0.036 0.156 0.251 0.252 
Robust P-value in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In addition, if a facility has a larger impact on a local community’s economy, the facility 
is more likely to install BOD treatment capital. As with local environmental concerns, this positive 
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effect is statistically significant only in the Models 1 and 2 estimates. Once we control for facility 
characteristics, the effect becomes insignificant. Thus, our conclusion is not robust to the choice 
of regressor set. In contrast to local environmental concerns, these results weakly support 
Hypothesis H1b. 
Table 1.3.2 
Probit Estimation of Dierct Local Ccommunity Pressure on the Facility  Use of 










Environmental concerns of the 
local community  
 
0.355 0.325 0.219 0.261 
(0.144) (0.204) (0.422) (0.342) 
The Economic impact of the 
facility 
0.411** 0.391* 0.173 0.126 
(0.024) (0.053) (0.436) (0.589) 
Contral Factors  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions(*)  No No No Yes 
Observations 248 248 238 238 
R-squared 0.036 0.156 0.251 0.252 
- Robust P-value in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Thus, results for the two local community dimensions (weakly) support competing 
hypotheses. Greater local community pressure driven by environmental concerns does not appear 
to crowd out pro-social motivations (or at least not sufficiently so), while greater local community 
pressure stemming from a weaker concern about a facility’s economic impact appears to crowd 
out pro-social motivations. This pair of conclusions is theoretically possible. Nevertheless, future 
research – both theoretical and empirical -- should explore this combination of effects more 
closely, as Section 8 discusses further. 
Next, we interpret the TSS capital-related results shown in Table 1.4.2 If a facility feels a 
greater need to respond to local environmental concerns, the facility is less likely to install TSS 
treatment capital. However, this negative effect is statistically significant only in the Models 3 and 
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4 estimates. We must control for facility characteristics in order to generate a significant effect. 
Thus, our conclusion is not robust across the regressor sets. Still, these results moderately support 
Hypothesis H1b since the effect proves significant when using the larger regressor sets. 
Table1.4.1 
Liner Probablity Estimation of Direct Local Community Pressure on the Facility  Use of 









Environmental concerns of the 
local community  
 
-0.0534 -0.0731 -0.124 -0.148 
(0.523) (0.405) (0.142) (0.100) 
The Economic impact of the 
facility 
0.122* 0.119* 0.0597 0.0576 
(0.074) (0.100) (0.428) (0.449) 
Contral Factors  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions(*)  No No No Yes 
Observations 246 246 236 236 
R-squared 0.014 0.063 0.151 0.194 
Robust P-value in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
In addition, if a facility more greatly impacts a local community’s economy, the facility is 
more likely to install BOD treatment capital. This positive effect is statistically significant only in 
the Models 1 and 2 estimates. Once we control for facility characteristics, the effect becomes 
insignificant. Thus, our conclusion is not robust to the choice of regressor set. Similar to local 
environmental concerns, these results (at least weakly) support Hypothesis H1b.Thus, results for 
the two local community dimensions support the same hypothesis (Hypothesis H1b). Regardless 
of the local community dimension, greater local community pressure crowds out pro-social 
motivations. Overall, our estimates for environmental capital mostly support Hypothesis H1b; the 






Probit Estimation of Direct Local Community Pressure on the Facility  Use of Total 









Environmental concerns of the 
local community  
 
-0.167 -0.224 -0.401 -0.444 
(0.507) (0.392) (0.139) (0.127) 
The Economic impact of the 
facility 
0.344* 0.346* 0.182 0.119 
(0.063) (0.076) (0.390) (0.588) 
Contral Factors  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions(*)  No No No Yes 
Observations 248 248 236 230 
- Robust P-value in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
1.7.2.3. Annual Count of Environmental Self-Audits 
Using the panel data, we estimate a facility’s choice over the frequency of self-audits as 
measured by the annual count of audits. Table 4 displays the random effects negative binomial 
estimates10. As shown in Table 4, if a facility feels a greater need to respond to local environmental 
concerns, the facility conducts fewer self-audits. However, this effect is only statistically 
significant in the Models 1 and 2 estimates. Thus, once we control for facility characteristics, the 
effect becomes insignificant. Thus, our conclusion is not robust to the choice of regressor set. 
These results provide only weak evidence to support Hypothesis H1b. 
In addition, the effect of a facility’s economic impact is positive. If a facility more greatly 
impacts a local community’s economy, the facility conducts more self-audits. This positive effect 
is statistically significant regardless of the regressor set. Thus, our conclusion is robust to the 
                                                 
10 We test whether the negative binomial estimator dominates the Poisson estimator, which is another standard count 
data estimator, by assessing over-dispersion; the likelihood ratio test statistic rejects the null hypothesis of no over-
dispersion (p=0.00). We also test whether a zero-inflated model is warranted; the Vuong test statistic fails to reject 
the null hypothesis of a non-excessive count of zeros (p=0.00).  
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choice of control factors. These results strongly support Hypothesis H1b. Overall, both local 
community dimensions demonstrate that greater local community pressure crowds out pro-social 
motivations so much that this effect dominates. 
Table 1.5.1 
Results of Random Effects Negative Binomial of Direct Local Community Pressure on the 










Environmental concerns of the 
local community  
 
-0.578** -0.550* -0.443 -0.517 
(0.045) (0.067) (0.141) (0.101) 
The Economic impact of the 
facility 
0.505** 0.467** 0.443* 0.481** 
(0.019) (0.030) (0.056) (0.041) 
Contral Factors  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 686 686 649 648 
- Robust P-value in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Overall, our results for three types of environmental management – labor, capital, and 
protocols – support different competing hypotheses. Our environmental labor results support 
Hypothesis H1a, our environmental capital results support both Hypotheses H1a and H1b but 
mostly Hypothesis H1b, and our environmental (audit) protocol results support Hypothesis H1b. 
These results collectively reveal that the crowding out effect stemming from local community 
pressure influences different types of environmental management differently. 
To interpret these differences, recall that pro-social motivations include both intrinsic and 
reputational motivations. While intrinsic motivation relies on internal introspection, reputational 
motivation relies on visibility. Clearly environmental management types differ in their visibility. 
We conjecture that environmental capital is more visible than environmental labor. If true, the 
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crowding out of reputational motivation should play a greater role for environmental capital. Our 
results are consistent with this distinction. 
Table 1.5.2 
Results of Random Effects  Incident Rate Ratio of  Direct Local Community Pressure on 










Environmental concerns of the 
local community  
 
0.561** 0.577* 0.642 0.596 
(0.045) (0.067) (0.141) (0.101) 
The Economic impact of the 
facility 
1.657** 1.596** 1.558* 1.618** 
(0.019) (0.030) (0.056) (0.041) 
Contral Factors  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 686 686 649 648 
- Robust P-value in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1.7.2.4. Marginal Effects of Local Community Factors 
Our primary results assess the signs and statistical significance of our coefficient estimates. 
In order to assess the economic importance of our estimated effects, we calculate marginal effects 
for both primary regressors and all five dependent variables. Consider first environmental labor. 
The pooled OLS and random effects coefficient estimates reflect marginal effects. As shown in 
Table 2, if a facility feels a greater need to respond to local environmental concerns, the facility 
increases the ratio of environmental to overall employees by 0.047 to 0.051, depending on the 
model and estimator. If a facility more greatly impacts a local economy, then the facility reduces 
this ratio by 0.038 to 0.050. Relative to a sample mean of 0.049, these impacts seem quite 
important. 
Consider next the marginal effects on environmental capital. The linear probability model 
coefficient estimates reflect marginal effects. See Tables 1.6.1 and 1.6.2. The Probit coefficients 
reflect the marginal effect only on the index function. To evaluate the marginal effect on the 
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probability of adoption, we must condition on particular values of the regressors. As one common 
practice, for each primary regressor, we calculate the marginal effect based on each observation’s 
values for the other regressors and then calculate the average of these observation-specific 
marginal effects, i.e., average marginal effect. Tables 3.c and 4.c. display these average marginal 
effects for BOD capital and TSS capital, respectively. 
For BOD treatment capital, the linear probability model coefficients reveal that, if a facility 
feels a greater need to respond to local environmental concerns, the likelihood of adoption rises by 
0.136 % to 0.0757 %, depending on the model. If a facility more greatly impacts a local economy, 
the likelihood of adoption rises by 0.058 % to 0.160%. The Probit-based marginal effects are 
similar. If a facility feels a greater need to respond to local environmental concerns, the likelihood 
of adoption rises by 0.079 % to 0.138 %, depending on the model. If a facility more greatly impacts 
a local economy, the likelihood of adoption rises by 0.054 % to 0.160 %. Relative to a sample 
mean of 58 %, these impacts seem important. 
Table 1.6.1 
Average marginal estimation of Direct Local Community Pressure on the existence of 
Biochemical Oxygen Demand treatment (BOD) 
 








Environmental concerns of the local community  
 
0.138 0.115 0.069 0.0792 
The Economic impact of the facility 0.160 0.139 0.054 0.0380 
 
Marginal effects for TSS treatment capital reveal similarly important impacts. Based on 
the linear probability model coefficients, if a facility feels a greater need to respond to local 
environmental concerns, the likelihood of adoption decreases by 0.148 % to 0.0534 %, depending 
on the model. If a facility more greatly impacts a local economy, the likelihood of adoption rises 
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by 0.057 % to 0.122%. Similarly, the Probit-based marginal effects reveal that, if a facility feels a 
greater need to respond to local environmental concerns, the likelihood of adoption decreases by 
0.121 % to 0.558 %. If a facility more greatly impacts a local economy, the likelihood of adoption 
rises by 0.035 % to 0.123 %. Again, relative to a sample mean of 69 %, these impacts seem 
important. 
Table 1.6.2 
Average marginal estimation of Direct Local Community Pressure on Facility  Use of Total 
Suspended Solids Treatment (TSS) 
 








Environmental concerns of the local 
community  
 
-0.558 -0.711 -0.114 -0.121 
The Economic impact of the facility 0.123 0.119 0.057 0.035 
Lastly, we assess the marginal effects of local community factors on the annual count of 
environmental self-audits. For this assessment, we calculate incident rate ratios based on the 
underlying coefficient estimate.11 These ratios reflect the impact of a one-unit change in each of 
the primary regressors on the count of audits. A ratio of one implies no impact. A ratio below one 
implies a negative impact, while a ratio above one implies a positive impact. 
Table 1.6.3 displays the incidence rate ratios. If a facility feels a greater need to respond to local 
environmental concerns, the facility reduces its frequency of self-audits by 44 % to 36 %, 
depending on the model. If a facility more greatly impacts a local economy, the facility increases 
its audit frequency by 56 % to 66 %. Clearly, these impacts are economically important. 
 
                                                 
11 Each negative binomial coefficient reflects the difference between the log of expected counts. Let X capture the 
regressor, β the regression coefficient, and μ the expected count. Identify two specific values of X that reflect a one-
unit difference in X: X0 and X0+1. Given this notation, the difference between the log of expected counts is written as 
follows: β = log(μ[X0+1]) – log (μ[X0]). The difference between two logs is equal to the log of their quotient. Therefore, 





Results of Random Effects  Incident Rate Ratio of  Direct Local Community Pressure on 










Environmental concerns of the 
local community  
 
0.561** 0.577* 0.642 0.596 
(0.045) (0.067) (0.141) (0.101) 
The Economic impact of the 
facility 
1.657** 1.596** 1.558* 1.618** 
(0.019) (0.030) (0.056) (0.041) 
Contral Factors  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 686 686 649 648 
- Robust P-value in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0 
 
1.8. Conclusions  
This study explores the effects of local community pressure on corporate environmental 
management as reflected in regulated facilities’ employment of environmental labor, installation 
of environmental capital (i.e., wastewater treatment equipment), and use of environmental 
protocols (i.e., frequency of self-audits). Local community pressure stems from two local 
dimensions: local environmental concerns in general and the local economic impact of an 
individual facility. Our theoretical analysis generates two competing hypotheses, which differ 
based on the importance of any pro-social motivations possibly held by facility management 
personnel and the extent to which local community pressure crowds out these motivations. Our   
empirical analysis tests these hypotheses by examining the environmental management effort 
expended by chemical manufacturing facilities regulated under the Clean Water Act between the 
years 1999 to 2001. 
In general, the empirical results suggest that local community pressure greatly affect 
corporate environmental management. However, our results for three types of environmental 
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management – labor, capital, and protocols – support different competing hypotheses. Our 
environmental labor results support Hypothesis H1a, revealing no meaningful role for the 
crowding out of pro-social motivations. Our environmental capital results support both Hypotheses 
H1a and H1b but mostly Hypothesis H1b, the latter revealing a sufficiently strong crowding out 
effect. And our environmental (audit) protocol results support Hypothesis H1b, again 
demonstrating a substantial crowding out effect. These results collectively reveal that the crowding 
out effect stemming from local community pressure influences different types of environmental 
management differently. 
Our analysis provides some evidence on some effectiveness of local community pressure 
as a tool for inducing better corporate environmental management. However, our analysis mostly 
offers evidence of counter-productive local community pressure. Regardless, we contribute to both 
the scholarly literature and policy debate. This said, we acknowledge the limitations of our 
research. Our study examines only one sector’s environmental management efforts to control 
pollution disposed into one medium (water) over a three-year period (1999-2001). And we 
examine only one form of non-regulatory external pressure: local community pressure. We 
encourage future research to broaden the scope of this empirical analysis by exploring additional 









2 The Effect of Spatially Defined Local Community Characteristics on Corporate 
Environmental Management 
2.1.Introduction 
A substantial literature examines the ways community characteristics affect local 
environmental outcomes. Several studies have shown the importance of various economic and 
political factors in explaining the level of toxic releases or local ambient pollution (e.g., Kriesel et 
al. 1996; Arora and Cason 1999). Explanatory variables common to many of these studies include 
household incomes, house values, population density, educational attainment, poverty rate, racial 
composition, voting behavior, and other measures of local demographics, economic conditions, 
and political opposition.  In this paper, we examine whether local factors impose more 
environmental pressures on the industrial facilities regulated under the Clean Water and increase 
the level of water pollution abatement.  
The principle motivation here is to provide additional evidence on which community 
characteristics impact local environmental outcomes. This paper’s chief innovation in the realm of 
literature on water pollution, is that it is the first to examine the effects of spatially defined local 
community characteristics on the corporate environmental management. To deliver this 
contribution, firstly, we examine the effects of nonspatial local community characteristics within 
1,5,10 and 15-mile radii of the regulated facility location. Secondly, we construct rings of those 
economic, demographic, and socioeconomic local community characteristics within the distance 
gap between 1-5-mile radii, 5-10-mile radii and 10-15-mile radii.  
In principle, the effects studies based on the spatially defined local community characteristics 
should yield the same expected effects as studies based on non-spatial local community 
characteristics since they are all obviously interrelated. However, given potentially serious 
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concerns with the spatial measurement of some of these environmental outcomes, the examination 
of several different ones is certainly a worthwhile endeavor.  
Controlling for facility characteristics and various forms of environmental regulation, the 
preliminary results of non- spatial community characteristics indicate certain community 
characteristics (e.g. per household income) found to have additional effects on the corporate 
environmental choice of environmental labor and capital. However, the preliminary results of the 
spatially defined local community characteristics are not in favor of this hypotheses. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 
constructs a theoretical framework, which generates testable hypotheses. Section 4 describes the 
econometric framework. Section 5 discusses the data and provides summary statistics. Section 6 
details the econometric analysis and reports the empirical results, while interpreting them as a 
means for testing theoretically derived hypotheses. Section 7 concludes and assesses briefly future 
research. 
2.2. Literature Review 
In Chapter one we explore most of the literature that explore the effect of local community 
pressure, here we will have relisted some of these literatures focusing on the literature that analyses 
explore the effect of local community pressure on corporate environmental management or 
performance using local community demographic or socioeconomic characteristics, which serve 
as proxies or indirect measures of local community pressure. The set of local community 
characteristics that we focus on here is the one adopted by this analysis which include demographic 
(e.g. median age, black share of the community) economics (e.g. median household income and 
housing status) and socioeconomic characteristics (e.g. poverty and educational attainment) 
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Few empirical studies analyze the effect of the demographic characteristics of the local 
community such as the community average or median age and the community minority proportion  
(Arora and Cason, 1999; Pargal et al., 1997; Pargal and Wheeler, 1996). Most of these results 
reveal no significant effect. 
The most common economic characteristics used in the literature to measure local community 
pressure is the community median household income (Arora and Cason, 1999; Brooks and Sethi, 
1997; Hamilton, 1993). Most of these studies conclude that greater pressure as captured by higher 
community income leads to better environmental performance from facilities located in the 
community. 
Several empirical studies use socioeconomic community such as the community 
educational attainment as proxy for a community’s intellectual sophistication generally or 
environmental sophistication specifically (e.g., Pargal and Wheeler, 1996). One study uses the 
percentage of adults with four or more years of college (Hamilton, 1993). Other studies use the 
percentage of people aged 25 years or more with at least a bachelor’s degree (Brooks and Sethi, 
1997; Arora and Cason, 1999; Maxwell et al., 2000; Becker, 2003). Additionally, some studies use 
the high school graduation rate or percentage of local residents with at least a high school diploma 
(Earnhart , 2004b; Wolverton, 2009). Pargal and Wheeler, 1996 finds that communities with high 
level of education gives high weight to water pollution. Brooks and Sethi (1997) demonstrate that 
educational attainment is significantly and negatively related to exposure to air pollution. 
Moreover, Arora and Cason (1999) find that people aged 25 years or more with at least a bachelor’s 
degree are significantly and negatively affect the toxics release inventory in most of the U.S. 
regions. In contrast, Becker (2003) shows that educational attainment has statistically zero effects 
on air pollution abatement (APA) expenditure by U.S manufacturing plants. 
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Our study contributes to this ongoing literature by defining the local community 
characteristics spatially. Our analysis uses data gathered on 1- mile, 5-miles, 10-miles and 15 miles 
radii to construct a ring of the distance within those different mile radii.   
2.3. Conceptual Framework 
Similar to chapter one, this section sketches a conceptual framework from which we derive 
testable hypotheses. An individual firm regulated under the Clean Water Act engage in 
environmental management in order to improve the local environment pressured by certain local 
community characteristics that spatially defined. These community characteristics are proxies for 
the local community pressures. In each period, the firm’s manager chooses the firm's level of 
environmental management, as measured by the amount & quality of environmental labor, the 
presence of environmental capital and the quality of environmental capital. The firm generates 
gross profits, incurs environmental management costs (e.g., upgrading treatment cost), and faces 
costs imposed by external regulatory and non-regulatory actors stemming from poor corporate 
environmental management. For example, the firm faces penalties imposed by the regulatory 
agency for failing to comply with environmental protection laws. The firm’s net profits equal gross 
profits less the sum of environmental management costs and external environmental costs. 
Following the above, the analysis hypothesis that the closer the local individual to the facility 
location, the higher their impacts on the facility environmental effort. That is local community 
pressure should fall away as distance grows. For example, the homeowners within 1- mile radius 
of the facility location in particular may demand greater pollution abatement efforts from their 
nearby facility compares to the homeowners within 5-miles or 10 mil radii. Similarly, the 
homeowners within the ring between the 1- 5 miles radii has more vested interest in pollution 
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abatement efforts from their nearby facility than the homeowners with the ring between the 5- 10 
miles radii. following that the analysis consider the following hypothesis  
𝐻1: 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  
That is:   
𝛽𝑖1 > 𝛽𝑖5 > 𝛽𝑖10 > 𝛽𝑖15 
While  𝐻1 is the main testing hypothesis, the analysis also considers testing the relation 
between each local community demographic, economics and socioeconomics characteristics and 








Local Community Characteristics  H1 H0 
Median age  𝛽 > 0 𝛽 ≤ 0 
Black share of population 𝛽 < 0 𝛽 ≥ 0 
Per household income (calendar year=1999, current 
$) 
𝛽 > 0 𝛽 ≤ 0 
Share of population aged 25 or over with bachelor's 
degree or higher 
𝛽 > 0 𝛽 ≤ 0 
Share of population living in same house as 1995 𝛽 > 0 𝛽 ≤ 0 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over 𝛽 > 0 𝛽 ≤ 0 
Owner-occupied share of housing 𝛽 > 0 𝛽 ≥ 0 
Share of population under poverty line 𝛽 < 0 𝛽 ≤ 0 
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2.4. Econometric Framework12 
2.4.1. Dependent Variables  
In each year t, facility i chooses its level of environmental management, denoted as Yit, 
which represents the amounts of labor, capital, or protocol devoted to environmental management: 
3. Environmental employees as a ratio of overall employees at a given facility; 
4. Extent of wastewater treatment upgrade; 
5. Extent of environmental training offered. 
Thus, our econometric analysis explores three types of dependent variables. It estimates the 
relationship between each of the three identified dependent variables and a set of primary 
regressors and control factors, as described below. 
2.4.2. Explanatory variables  
The set of primary regressors represent indirect measures of local community pressure 
represented by economics, demographic, and socioeconomics local community characteristics. We 
draw upon the previous literature for local characteristics that may influence outcomes of interests 
mentioned above as well as contribute through the spatial constriction of these variable as primary 
regressors to present accurate idea regard the individuals that immediately affected by the facility 
environmental behavior what extend the local community pressure may affects the environmental 
management. 
2.4.2.1. Non-Spatial Community Characteristics 
The local community characteristics implied in this analysis can be broadly—and 
somewhat arbitrarily—classified as belonging to one of three groups: (1) Economics local 
community characteristics which include per household income, which we transform to the log 
                                                 
12 The set of control factors are the same set used for the analysis of chapter 1 
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form as it skews toward the tail, and state of the housing market. The income is a common measure 
for local community pressure in the literature, as the demand for environmental quality, like that 
for any other good, may simply derive from income and preferences. If environmental protection 
is a normal good, wealthier communities might be expected to press for stricter requirements on 
their polluting plants. In addition, we assess economics characteristics that capture state of the 
housing market (e.g. share of population living at the same house as 1995 and the owner-occupied 
share of housing) as the higher the owner-occupied share of housing in the local community may 
promote more stable community that advocate for the environment which drive the facility 
managers to consider more environmental friendly operating decisions. Similarly, litigation may 
result in compensation for reduced property values. (2) Demographic local community 
characteristics (e.g. Black share of the local community population) which we use to explore the 
apparent correlation between minority populations and local pollution levels and the siting of 
polluting facilities. This might be expected to reflect that subgroups of the population are 
“environmentally discriminated” to the point that they may not impose stricter requirements on 
their polluting facility. (3) Socioeconomics local community characteristics including median age, 
education attainment of the local community captured by the share of population aged 25 or over 
with bachelor’s degree or higher, gender measure and the share of poor population. Local 
communities with high rates of poverty and/or low levels of educational attainment may result in 
lower damages being awarded in the event of injuries and/or deaths from accidental exposure to 
pollution. This also may reflect on the notion of environmental injustice.  
2.4.2.2. Spatially Defined Local Community Characteristics   
All the community characteristics mentioned in section 4.2.a are gathered within one- mile 
radius of each respective polluting facility in order to present accurate idea regard the individuals 
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that immediately affected by the facility environmental behavior. Nevertheless, this radius is 
extended up to maximum fifteen-mile radius to test whether the regression result holds or not. 
Furthermore, we spatially define the local community characteristics by construct rings of these 
characteristics of represents the distance between the four different mile radii as represented by 
figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 



















𝑿𝟏𝟓−𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒆 − 𝑿𝟏𝟎−𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒆  
𝑿𝟏𝟎−𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒆 − 𝑿𝟓−𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒆  
𝑋5−𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒 − 𝑋1−𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒  
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As figure 2.1 shows the rings take a donut shape where the hole of the donut represents the local 
community characteristics within 1- mile radius of the polluted facility. The first ring represents 
the distance between the 5-mile radius and 1- mile radius. Here, the spatial local community 
characteristics, which are the second set of regressors for this analysis, are calculated by taking the 
difference of each characteristics within the different mile radii. For instance,  𝑋5−1 is the local 
community characteristics within the distance between the 5-mile radius and 1- mile radius is 
calculated following  
𝑿𝟓−𝟏 =  𝑿𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏 𝟓 𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒖𝒊𝒔 − 𝑿𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏 𝟏 𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒖𝒊𝒔  
2.5. Data 
2.5.1. Sources  
Our study exploits data on our dependent variables using our study exploits data collected 
using an original survey of regulated facilities operating in the chemical manufacturing industry; 
see Earnhart and Glicksman (2011) for details. The survey consists of a number of confidential 
questions that gather data on environmental management practices undertaken by individual 
facilities.   
The primary regressors data collected using United States Census Bureau. As we use the 
2002 economic census data to construct the economics, demographic, and socioeconomics 
community measures at a county level. These measures are sorted into one, five, ten, and fifteen –
mile radius increments of the facility location.   
To complement the above data, our study also collected data from the EPA PCS database 
on each facility's location, NPDES major or minor classification, and four-digit standard industrial 
classification (SIC) code. The PCS database also provides data on inspections conducted by federal 
and state regulators. The PCS database and the EPA Docket database provide data on federal 
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enforcement actions.  
The data in use constructed into multiple surveys including a cross-sectional survey 
(snapshot) made up to 12 months preceding survey completion, a survey spanning the results of 
three-year window made up to 36 months preceding survey completion, and finally a panel data 
survey for the period (1999-2001) clearly made in years prior to survey completion (i.e., 
2002,2003). 
2.5.2. Statistical Summary 
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the dependent variables, primary regressors, and 
control factors. As shown in Table 1, the ratio of environmental employees to overall employees 
is about 0.05. Of the sampled facilities, roughly 61 % operate wastewater treatment upgrading, 
and 93% offer environmental training. While this average may seem high, it reflects a skewed 
distribution since 7 % of the sampled facilities do not offer environmental training in a given 
calendar year. The average median age of the local community the 1- mile radius is 36 years while 
it shrinks down to -0.14 when we spatially defined the median age within the 1-5-mile radii. Of 
the sampled of local community within 1- mile radius, 17% of the population is black compare to 
-0.05% within the rings of the distance between the 1-5-mile radii. The average per household 
income for the household within the 1-mile radius is $ 47.85 compared to $1.42 for the household 
within the 1-5-mile ring. 15 % of the population of the local community within the 1- mile are over 
25 years old with bachelor’s degree or higher compare to 0.26% of the population within the 1-5-
mile ring. The share of population living at the same house is 60% within the 1- mile compare to 
-0.15% within the ring of 1-5 mile. The local community within the 1-mile is 64% owner occupied 





Descriptive  Statistics  




Ratio of Environmental Employees to Overall Employees 746 0.490 0.131 
Wastwater tretment upgrade – any kind (vs . none) 256 0.613 0.487 
Extent of environmental trining (vs.  none) 265 0.932 0.252 
Local Community Characteristics within 1-Mile Radius (*) 
Median age  795 36.01 4.414 
Black share of population  795 0.174 0.236 
Log of Per household income  795 -3.82 0.285 
Share of population aged 25 or over with bachelor’s degree or 
higher 
795 0.149 0.086 
Share of population living in same house as 1995 795 0.593 0.086 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over 795 0.480 0.029 
Owner-occupied share of housing 795 0.643 0.143 
Share of population under poverty line 795 0.149 0.094 
Spatially Defined Local Community Characteristics within the Ring between 1- Mile& 5- Mile 
radii  
Median age  795 -0.147 3.248 
Black share of population  795 0.014 0.130 
Log of Per household income  477 -1.267 1.354 
Share of population aged 25 or over with bachelor’s degree or 
higher 
795 0.026 0.060 
Share of population living in same house as 1995 795 -0.015 0.061 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over 795 -0.003 0.261 
Owner-occupied share of housing 795 -0.015 0.107 
Share of population under poverty line 795 -0.005 0.060 
 
Although the male percentage of the local community within the 1- mile is 48%, the male 
percentage drop to -0.03% within the 1-5 ring. Finally, the poor share of the local community 
within the 1- mile radius is 15%, while it is only appears to be -0.05% within the 1-5 mile radii 
ring. 
2.6. Econometric Analysis 
 This section describes our econometric analysis. 
2.6.1. Estimation Techniques 
For our analysis, we adopt different estimation techniques to address the variety of data. 
First, to accommodate and exploit the panel data, the empirical analysis employs standard panel 
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data estimation techniques. The measures of local community pressure do not vary over time. For 
this reason, the panel data analysis focuses on pooled OLS, which generates at least consistent 
estimates for time-invariant factors, and random effects estimation, which is consistent under 
certain conditions. 
The environmental employment measure captures a continuous dependent variable so 
standard estimators are sufficient. However, the environmental capital measures and extent of 
environmental training offered are binary dependent variables, reflecting the presence or absence 
of upgrading the treatment for a particular pollutant or the whether the pollutant facility offer 
environmental training or not. Following the literature, we implement both a linear probability 
model and a Probit estimator to explore these binary outcomes.  
Also, we explore the effects of local community presser using both spatially and none-
spatial defined local community characteristics of local within the different mile radii of the 
pollutant facility location. 
To assess the robustness of our results, the empirical analysis uses four different regressor 
sets (i.e., models), which vary based on the inclusion of control factors. The first regressor set is 
the parsimonious model (Model 1), which excludes all control factors. The second set adds year 
and regional indicators (Model 2). The third set adds facility characteristics (Model 3). The full set 
includes all the control factors (Model 4). The next sub-section primarily uses the full model 
estimates to interpret the empirical results. The econometric analysis clusters standard errors at the 
facility level when analyzing the panel data. 
2.6.2. Empirical Results  
This sub-section interprets the results for the primary regressors. Appendix B interprets the 
results for the control factors. 
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2.6.2.1. Results Using Non-Spatial Local Community Characteristics   
2.6.2.1. a. Ratio of Environmental Employees to Overall Facility Employees 
Table 2.2 displays the results from the pooled OLS regression and random effects 
estimation of the ratio of environmental employees to overall facility employees with the different 
miles. Here we focus on the significant results. 
The pooled OLS estimators within the 1-mile radius for the black share of the community, 
the education attainment measure and the gender measure indicate a positive and significate effects 
on the ratio of environmental employees. Both, the education attainment measure and the gender 
measure results hold the same using the random effects estimator.13  
The results of the RE estimator for the education attainments hold the same within the 5, 
10 and 15 mil radii and it the only variable that indicates positive statically significant results. 
Collectively these results support the hypothesis highest levels of educational attainment may 
result in increasing the number of environmental employees hired by the facility. The result listed 
in appendix A. 
2.6.2. 1. b. Presence of Environmental Capital 
Using the cross-sectional data, we estimate a facility’s choice to upgrade the wastewater treatment. 
The results shown in Table 2.3 for linear probability estimators and table 4 for the Probit estimator. 
Both estimators generate the same results which indicates a significant statistical correlation 
between only the education attainments and upgrade the wastewater treatment, however, these 
results are skeptical as its inconsistent within the different mile radius. For that future 
                                                 
13 The Durbin–Wu–Hausman test indicates the inconsistency of the OLS estimator, so our preferred specification 




investigations for these results need to be done. The 5 Mile radius and above results listed in 
Appendix B.    
Table 2.2.1 
Pooled OLS Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within 1- Mile Radius on the 
Ratio of facility environmental employees  








     
Median age  -0.000960 -0.000304 -0.000534 -0.000607 
 (0.469) (0.818) (0.681) (0.647) 
Black share of population 0.0446** 0.0625*** 0.0592*** 0.0661**
* 
 (0.045) (0.009) (0.010) (0.005) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
0.0759 0.0498 0.0378 0.0546 
 (0.118) (0.200) (0.310) (0.175) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
0.496*** 0.370*** 0.392*** 0.437*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995 
-0.125 -0.0299 -0.00635 -0.00626 
 (0.223) (0.708) (0.936) (0.938) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over 0.615*** 0.550*** 0.567*** 0.598*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) 
Owner-occupied share of housing 0.0208 -0.0245 -0.0681 -0.0609 
 (0.712) (0.578) (0.146) (0.215) 
Share of population under poverty line  -0.188** -0.177** -0.179** -0.191** 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions(*)  No No No Yes 
Observations 724 724 709 709 
R-squared 0.084 0.172 0.203 0.230 














Random Effects Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within 1- Mile Radius on 
the Ratio of facility environmental employees  








     
Median age  -0.000976 -0.000348 -0.000561 -0.000465 
 (0.691) (0.890) (0.824) (0.854) 
Black share of population 0.0357 0.0553 0.0533 0.0551 
 (0.518) (0.336) (0.354) (0.337) 
Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
0.0701 0.0406 0.0285 0.0300 
 (0.288) (0.583) (0.701) (0.686) 
Share of population aged 25 or 
over with bachelor's degree or 
higher 
0.483*** 0.352** 0.371** 0.388** 
 (0.002) (0.039) (0.031) (0.024) 
Share of population living in 
same house as 1995 
-0.108 -0.0211 0.000294 -0.0130 
 (0.406) (0.884) (0.998) (0.928) 
Male share of populations aged 
18 or over 
0.607* 0.544* 0.556* 0.565* 
 (0.056) (0.088) (0.082) (0.077) 
Owner-occupied share of 
housing 
0.0124 -0.0271 -0.0651 -0.0531 
 (0.896) (0.806) (0.566) (0.641) 
Share of population under 
poverty line 
-0.172 -0.147 -0.153 -0.139 
 (0.396) (0.475) (0.461) (0.505) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 724 724 709 709 













Linear Probability Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within 1- Mile Radius 
on the Treatment Upgrade 








     
Median age  0.00370 0.000744 0.00300 0.000856 
 (0.691) (0.940) (0.767) (0.932) 
Black share of population 0.123 0.0468 0.0856 0.0202 
 (0.542) (0.829) (0.700) (0.927) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
-0.190 -0.243 -0.214 -0.299 
 (0.477) (0.417) (0.480) (0.336) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
-0.636 -0.792 -0.857 -1.165 
 (0.298) (0.255) (0.224) (0.112) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995 
0.0817 0.220 0.198 0.170 
 (0.866) (0.688) (0.715) (0.760) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or 
over 
-1.182 -1.297 -1.311 -1.466 
 (0.314) (0.284) (0.274) (0.227) 
Owner-occupied share of housing 0.331 0.186 0.230 0.0578 
 (0.377) (0.670) (0.619) (0.903) 
Share of population under poverty line  0.763 0.596 0.536 0.427 
 (0.305) (0.453) (0.500) (0.599) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 253 253 244 244 
R-squared 0.033 0.055 0.070 0.119 
Robust P-value in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
2.6.2. 1. c. Extent of Environmental Training  
Using the cross-sectional data, we estimate a facility’s choice to offer an environmental 
training. The results shown in Table 2.4 for linear probability estimators and the Probit estimator.  
The results of Linear probability and Probit estimators indicates a positive significant 





Probit Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within 1- Mile Radius on the 
Treatment Upgrade 








     
Median age  0.00978 0.00114 0.00702 0.000703 
 (0.690) (0.965) (0.789) (0.979) 
Black share of population 0.356 0.134 0.238 0.0580 
 (0.528) (0.821) (0.694) (0.925) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
-0.517 -0.729 -0.710 -0.728 
 (0.459) (0.369) (0.383) (0.395) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
-1.643 -2.154 -2.462 -2.905 
 (0.304) (0.239) (0.183) (0.134) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995 
0.257 0.736 0.693 0.409 
 (0.841) (0.615) (0.635) (0.785) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over -3.203 -3.658 -3.893 -4.543 
 (0.313) (0.267) (0.239) (0.170) 
Owner-occupied share of housing 0.900 0.460 0.545 0.315 
 (0.349) (0.686) (0.647) (0.799) 
Share of population under poverty line  2.172 1.805 1.769 1.440 
 (0.286) (0.399) (0.410) (0.509) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions(*)  No No No Yes 
Observations 253 253 244 244 
Robust P-value in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
these results are weakly significant within the first mile radius, but the significant level keep 
increasing when we test the result within the different mile radii. More interestingly, both 
estimations results indicate a negative significant correlation between the share of poor population 
and the choice to effort environmental training. The significant of this result does not hold within 
the 15-mile radius. Appendix C display those results.   
These results support the hypothesis that the wealthier the community the more 
environmental training the facility would offer for its employees.  
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On contrast to our hypothesis, estimators for the owner occupancy share of the local 
community with the 1 mile indicates a negative significant correlation regardless the estimation 
type, however the significance of these results disappear as soon as we consider the owner 
Table 2.4.1 
Linear Probability Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within 1- Mile Radius 
on the Extent of Environmental Training 








     
Median age  -0.00320 -0.00323 -0.00222 -0.00231 
 (0.359) (0.368) (0.547) (0.552) 
Black share of population 0.0982 0.0346 0.0548 0.0528 
 (0.309) (0.727) (0.591) (0.627) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
0.212 0.253* 0.266* 0.253* 
 (0.106) (0.068) (0.058) (0.065) 
Share of population aged 25 or over 
with bachelor’s degree or higher 
-0.462 -0.261 -0.282 -0.256 
 (0.143) (0.467) (0.430) (0.494) 
Share of population living in same 
house as 1995 
0.0189 0.258 0.289 0.298 
 (0.943) (0.424) (0.370) (0.370) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or 
over 
-0.223 -0.543 -0.467 -0.426 
 (0.546) (0.216) (0.366) (0.421) 
Owner-occupied share of housing -0.416** -0.604** -0.739*** -0.739** 
 (0.042) (0.022) (0.007) (0.010) 
Share of population under poverty line  -1.177*** -1.360*** -1.549*** -1.513*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 262 262 251 251 
R-squared 0.096 0.137 0.183 0.189 










Probit Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within 1- Mile Radius on the Extent 
of Environmental Training 








     
Median age  -0.0242 -0.0263 -0.0195 -0.0240 
 (0.475) (0.484) (0.631) (0.561) 
Black share of population 0.834 0.237 0.468 0.430 
 (0.388) (0.785) (0.591) (0.622) 
Log of Per household income 
(calendar year=1999, current $) 
0.884 1.286 1.616 1.570 
 (0.348) (0.230) (0.170) (0.234) 
Share of population aged 25 or over 
with bachelor’s degree or higher 
-2.726 -1.043 -0.686 -0.538 
 (0.238) (0.711) (0.814) (0.864) 
Share of population living in same 
house as 1995 
0.392 1.967 1.976 2.338 
 (0.853) (0.389) (0.353) (0.275) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or 
over 
-2.318 -5.595 -3.628 -3.984 
 (0.548) (0.146) (0.434) (0.359) 
Owner-occupied share of housing -3.750* -5.371** -6.693** -7.084*** 
 (0.069) (0.033) (0.012) (0.009) 
Share of population under poverty 
line  
-7.862*** -9.545*** -12.03*** -12.31*** 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions(*)  No No No Yes 
Observations 262 262 251 251 
Robust P-value in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
occupancy rate within the 5 or 10-mile radius. Also, the median age indicates a negative correlation 
when we consider the median age of the local community within the 5- mile radius. The results 
listed in appendix C. 
Some of the results of this section clearly indicates the effects of the local community 
characteristics on the corporate environmental choice. Specifically, the economics characteristics 
measured by per household income and the education attainments.  
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2.6.2.2. Results using Spatially Defined Local Community Characteristics  
2.6.2.2. a. Ratio of Environmental Employees to Overall Facility Employees 
Using the spatially defined local community characteristics we estimate a pooled OLS 
and RE estimation to capture the effects of these characteristics on the facility choice of 
environmental labor. Table2.5 display the results of OLS estimator and the RE estimator results.  
The Durbin–Wu–Hausman test indicates the inconsistency of the OLS estimator, so our 
preferred specification  
would be the RE estimator. When we test the effect of the community characteristics in each ring 
separately. The RE estimators indicated statistically zero correlation between the spatially defined 
community characteristics and the choice of environmental labor. However, based on the 
collinearity test between these characteristics result, we estimate both pooled OLS and RE 
estimators treating these characteristics as one set of regressors. Table 2.5.2 displays the RE 
estimation results for this specification correlation. There are indicators of a correlation between 
the economics characteristics (e.g. per household income, the state of the housing market), 
socioeconomics characteristics (e.g. median age, education attainment, gender and poverty) and 
the facility choice of environmental labor. However, some of these results are inconsistent across 
















Pooled OLS estimation of Local Community Characteristics within the distance between 1-
Mile radius and 5- Mile Radius on the Ratio of facility environmental employees 








     
Median age  -0.000976 -0.000348 -0.000561 -0.000465 
 (0.691) (0.890) (0.824) (0.854) 
Black share of population 0.0357 0.0553 0.0533 0.0551 
 (0.518) (0.336) (0.354) (0.337) 
Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
0.0701 0.0406 0.0285 0.0300 
 (0.288) (0.583) (0.701) (0.686) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor's degree or higher 
0.483*** 0.352** 0.371** 0.388** 
 (0.002) (0.039) (0.031) (0.024) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995 
-0.108 -0.0211 0.000294 -0.0130 
 (0.406) (0.884) (0.998) (0.928) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or 
over 
0.607* 0.544* 0.556* 0.565* 
 (0.056) (0.088) (0.082) (0.077) 
Owner-occupied share of housing 0.0124 -0.0271 -0.0651 -0.0531 
 (0.896) (0.806) (0.566) (0.641) 
Share of population under poverty line -0.172 -0.147 -0.153 -0.139 
 (0.396) (0.475) (0.461) (0.505) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions(*)  No No No Yes 
Observations 439 439 427 427 
R-squared 0.015 0.152 0.210 0.250 

















Random Effects Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within the distance 
between 1-Mile radius and 5- Mile Radius on the Ratio of facility environmental employees 








     
Median age  -0.00167 -0.00340 -0.00330 -0.00316 
 (0.553) (0.241) (0.255) (0.276) 
Black share of population -0.0581 -0.0663 -0.0628 -0.0661 
 (0.455) (0.386) (0.415) (0.391) 
Log Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
-0.000710 -0.00306 -0.00434 -0.00431 
 (0.924) (0.701) (0.588) (0.591) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor's degree or higher 
-0.0357 -0.227 -0.205 -0.196 
 (0.853) (0.263) (0.311) (0.333) 





 (0.485) (0.984) (0.997) (0.935) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over -0.292 -0.302 -0.421 -0.406 
 (0.414) (0.391) (0.229) (0.246) 
Owner-occupied share of housing -0.0144 -0.102 -0.100 -0.0964 
 (0.912) (0.459) (0.476) (0.492) 
Share of population under poverty line 0.169 0.0509 0.0684 0.0720 
 (0.418) (0.806) (0.740) (0.727) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 439 439 427 427 
Robust P-value in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
ring between the 1- 5-mile radius using only parsimonious model, however, these results turn to 
negative regardless the estimator when we consider the local community characteristics with the 
5- 10 miles. Then again, regardless the estimator when we consider the local community 
characteristics with the 10- 15 miles, the results indicate a positive correlation. Appendix A display 





2.6.2. 2. b. Presence of Environmental Capital 
           Table 2.6.1 displays the results of linear probability estimation of spatially defined local 
community characteristics effects on the facility choices of upgrading wastewater treatment or not.  
The result does not indicate any statistical correlation between the spatially defined local 
community characteristics and the facility choice of treatment upgrading. The same conclusion 
holds for the results of the Probit estimator. Table 2.6.2 shows the results of the Probit estimations.  
2.6.2. 1. c. Extent of Environmental Training  
Table 2.7.1 displays the results of linear probability estimation of the effects of the spatially 
defined local community characteristics on the facility choices of offering environmental training 
or not. The result does not indicate any statistical correlation between the spatially defined local 
community characteristics and the facility choice of treatment upgrading. Nevertheless, the probit 
estimation indicates a positive correlation between the owner occupancy rate in the local 
communities with the 10- 15-mile radii ring only. 
2.7. Conclusions  
This study explores the effects of local community characteristics on corporate 
environmental management as reflected in regulated facilities’ employment of environmental 
labor, installation of environmental capital (i.e., upgrade of wastewater treatment), and extent of 
environmental training. We represent sets of local community characteristics include economics, 
demographic and socioeconomics characteristics of the local community. In addition, we explore 
a spatially defined local community characteristics that constructed as rings around the pollutant 







Linear Probability Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within the distance 
between 1- Mile Radius and 5 Miles Radius on the Treatment Upgrade 








     
Median age  0.0188* 0.0172 0.0185 0.0173 
 (0.095) (0.168) (0.133) (0.180) 
Black share of population -0.0418 -0.0686 -0.153 -0.209 
 (0.909) (0.854) (0.688) (0.593) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
0.0329 0.0328 0.0466 0.0390 
 (0.263) (0.392) (0.241) (0.390) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
-1.166 -1.317 -1.412 -1.478 
 (0.219) (0.212) (0.163) (0.170) 
Share of population living in same house as 
1995 
-1.748** -1.507 -1.585 -1.491 
 (0.048) (0.134) (0.118) (0.150) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over -0.181 -0.307 0.231 -0.341 
 (0.899) (0.835) (0.874) (0.823) 
Owner-occupied share of housing -0.780 -0.608 -0.558 -0.429 
 (0.187) (0.390) (0.435) (0.567) 
Share of population under poverty line  -1.081 -0.863 -0.884 -0.381 
 (0.258) (0.406) (0.389) (0.703) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 154 154 148 148 
R-squared 0.095 0.123 0.151 0.218 



















Probit Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within the distance between 1- Mile 
Radius and 5 Miles Radius on the Treatment Upgrade 








     
Median age  0.0564 0.0506 0.0545 0.0501 
 (0.119) (0.179) (0.147) (0.191) 
Black share of population -0.123 -0.218 -0.473 -0.760 
 (0.905) (0.832) (0.655) (0.504) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
0.0976 0.0949 0.130 0.108 
 (0.299) (0.390) (0.255) (0.405) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
-3.429 -4.022 -4.320 -5.325* 
 (0.195) (0.166) (0.127) (0.085) 
Share of population living in same house as 
1995 
-5.085* -4.614 -4.795* -4.687 
 (0.054) (0.108) (0.095) (0.121) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over -0.211 -0.643 0.851 -1.912 
 (0.963) (0.894) (0.861) (0.712) 
Owner-occupied share of housing -2.184 -1.671 -1.575 -1.564 
 (0.200) (0.378) (0.413) (0.451) 
Share of population under poverty line  -3.298 -2.712 -2.735 -0.975 
 (0.218) (0.330) (0.321) (0.739) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions(*)  No No No Yes 
Observations 154 153 147 144 












Linear Probability Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within the distance 
between 1-Mile radius and 5- Mile Radius on the Extent of Environmental Training 








     
Median age  0.00200 0.000716 -0.00113 -0.00304 
 (0.557) (0.864) (0.807) (0.575) 
Black share of population 0.000892 0.0307 0.0469 0.0427 
 (0.994) (0.836) (0.771) (0.817) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
0.0116 0.0144 0.0165 0.0187 
 (0.309) (0.264) (0.239) (0.245) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
0.0398 0.0463 0.0892 0.0913 
 (0.938) (0.938) (0.880) (0.883) 
Share of population living in same house as 
1995 
0.184 0.0935 0.0313 0.104 
 (0.493) (0.780) (0.929) (0.805) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over 0.000654 0.0864 0.314 0.113 
 (0.998) (0.778) (0.398) (0.765) 
Owner-occupied share of housing 0.269 0.342 0.469 0.391 
 (0.216) (0.208) (0.118) (0.211) 
Share of population under poverty line  0.0531 0.0232 0.0923 0.0734 
 (0.895) (0.963) (0.857) (0.899) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations     
R-squared     













Probit Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within the distance between 1- Mile 
Radius and 5 Miles Radius on the Extent of Environmental Training 








     
Median age  0.0170 -0.00659 -0.0913 -0.0596 
 (0.690) (0.913) (0.265) (0.460) 
Black share of population 0.0485 -1.186 -1.332 -0.928 
 (0.968) (0.489) (0.504) (0.662) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
0.176 0.175 0.275 0.370 
 (0.358) (0.276) (0.168) (0.318) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
1.462 -0.169 1.050 1.417 
 (0.763) (0.977) (0.860) (0.839) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995 
2.416 0.179 0.346 -1.734 
 (0.397) (0.962) (0.940) (0.676) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over 0.0833 -1.111 1.266 -1.836 
 (0.982) (0.776) (0.821) (0.797) 
Owner-occupied share of housing 3.182 7.453* 10.93** 11.61** 
 (0.139) (0.077) (0.042) (0.027) 
Share of population under poverty line  0.285 5.934 8.505 10.15 
 (0.939) (0.356) (0.248) (0.169) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions(*)  No No No Yes 
Observations 158 95 89 86 
 
Robust P-value in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Our analysis provides some evidence on the effects of economics and socioeconomics 
characteristics of local community. However, our analysis mostly offers evidence of counter-
productive local community pressure. And some of the results are skeptical and need future 
investigations. Regardless, we contribute to both the scholarly literature and policy debate. 
Similiter to chapter one, this analysis examines only one sector’s environmental management 
efforts to control pollution disposed into one medium (water) over a three-year period (1999-
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2001). We encourage future research to broaden the scope of this empirical analysis by exploring 




3 Effects of Terrorism on Labor Market: A Case Study of Iraq 
3.1. Introduction  
Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the United States, there has been considerable 
speculation and research about the effect of terrorism. Much of this research has focused on 
psychological costs rather than direct economic impacts. For instance, it may be the case that 
terrorist attacks increase the cost of supplying labor. If this is true, one way to measure such a cost 
is to determine how the suppliers of labor react to endangerment. When economic costs are 
considered, the analysis is generally limited to the economic consequences of one or non-
sequential terrorist attacks.  This study addresses each of these limitations in the literature by 
looking at sequential attacks (monthly) for the year 2007 in Iraq and by providing several 
estimations of the labor supply’s reaction to endangerment costs.  
Iraq’s economy has experienced a number of economic, psychological, sociological, and 
political shocks resulting from civil conflict and terrorism. Indeed, in recent years, Iraq has 
experienced an increasingly complex problem with terrorism as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) has grown in influence. With this context, then, it is particularly interesting to understand a 
picture of terrorism in Iraq post-2003 invasion and pre-2011 rise of ISIS. As such, we have taken 
a 2007 survey dataset to explore the impact of terrorism in Iraq between the two above-mentioned 
time periods. The importance of this kind of research cannot be understated as the mechanisms 
through which terrorism impacts a society are still not clearly understood. In fact, from an 
economic perspective, many studies of terrorism focus on more advanced countries (Eckstein and 
Tsiddon 2004). Further, these studies often focus on macroeconomic questions, as we will discuss 
later. However, in Iraq, one of the major economic consequences of the conflict and subsequent 
terrorist activity has been the shocks to the labor supply. As such, this project can offer a unique 
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contribution to the literature using microeconomic data to understand terrorism’s distortionary 
impact on the labor market. Additionally, understanding the impact of terrorist attacks on labor 
supply of countries under severe pressure from terrorism may provide future motivation for 
research into refugee crises and labor policies of destination countries. This would have policy 
implications for countries such as the United States that must make decisions about national 
security and immigration.  
This study provides empirical evidence on the economic consequences of terrorism on the 
labor market and labor force by examining the effect of terrorism in Iraq on the labor supply 
measured by, employment status, hours worked, wages and job permenance.  These contributions 
complement the work of Khan and Estrada (2016) who look at the macroeconomic performance 
in Iraq as a result of terrorism and the rise of ISIS.  Indeed, most of the influential studies, like the 
Khan and Estrada (2016) paper cited above, tend to focus on the macroeconomic impacts or study 
the labor market using country-level data. There are relatively few empirical studies that analyze 
the effect of terrorism on the labor market using household-level data. This paper fills that gap in 
the literature by taking a newly available dataset that surveys at the household level. Work in this 
area will complement work done at the macroeconomic level and will demonstrate at a granular 
level the way in which terrorism acts as a shock to the labor supply. The conceptual framework 
draws on work done with data from Palestine and, as such, could provide important policy 
implications for a country facing a multifaceted economic crisis and severe political instability.    
3.2. Literature Review  
While there is a growing interest in understanding the impact of violent conflict on various 
economic indicators, particularly using a micro-level approach (Prakarsh Singh 2012), much of 
the research focuses on the effects of terrorism on macroeconomic variables. Within the 
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macroeconomic literature, there has been important work on topics that range from savings to the 
stock market (For instance, see Venieris and Gupta, 1986; Mauro, 1995; Alesina and Perotti, 1996; 
Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Echstein and Tsiddon, 2004; Miquel et al., 2004).  When using 
data at a broader level, it can be difficult to find conclusive and consistent results across studies. 
With this in mind, previous work that includes time-series and cross-country studies has been 
inconclusive about the impact of terrorism on economic outcomes (For instance, see Blomberg et 
al., 2004; Crain and Crain, 2006; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2008; Gries et al., 2011; and Meierrieks 
and Gries, 2013). Depending on the time span of the study, the impact of terrorism may vary. 
Particularly when looking at long-run implications of terrorism, some authors have found that the 
impact on economic outcomes may be negligible (Becker and Murphy 2001). This may be due to 
variation in specifications, and the broad level of data may obscure important relationships 
between terrorism and the economy.  
When looking at specific parts of the economy, for instance, there are well-established 
links between terrorism, acting as a negative shock, and a decrease in economic activity in a 
particular sector. One sector that has been thoroughly studied has been tourism. Empirical work 
has shown that terrorist attacks can have a significant negative effect on tourism (Drakos and 
Kutan, 2003; Enders and Sandler, 1991; Enders et al., 1992; Greenbaum and Hultquist, 2006). 
Drakos and Kutan (2003) show that terrorism even has spillover effects on surrounding countries’ 
level of tourism, which raises an important question to examine the labor market of governorates 
in Iraq with own terrorist activity and spillover terrorist activity.     
 To think about the theoretical approach of this paper, there are two significant publications 
that provide a foundation for this work (Miaari and Sauer, 2011 and Benmelech et al., 2010). 
Miaari and Sauer (2011) analyze the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to estimate a lower bound of the 
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labor market costs of political instability. Their conflict measures are the number of overseas 
foreign workers in the Israeli labor market and the frequency of closures of the West Bank of the 
Gaza strip. The primary focus of their analysis is the effect of conflict on two economic outcomes 
in the Palestinian labor force in Israel: The employment rates of the population and the monthly 
earnings. Using an instrumental variable (IV) approach, they found significant negative effects of 
the conflict on Palestinian employment. This paper looks at the same economic outcomes, in the 
Iraqi context, and adds a gendered component that examines specific ideas about how conflict is 
both a gendered experience and produces gendered outcomes.   
Another publication that looks at the case of Palestine is Benmelech et al., (2010). They 
use the Palestinian Labor Force Survey to analyze the economic cost of terrorism on the 
perpetrators by estimating the effects of suicide terrorist attacks that are completed and the number 
of casualties from suicide attacks on unemployment and wages in the harboring district. 
Their results provide empirical evidence of the high economic consequences in the 
harboring district as it increases the local unemployment rate and lowers the average wage in 
addition to lowering the percentage of the district’s population working in Israel. This paper 
expands to include not only a measure of the impact of own district terrorism, but also builds a 
geospatial variable to incorporate potential spillover effects of terrorism in neighboring 
governorates of Iraq. 
Our contribution to this ongoing literature studies the effect of terrorism in Iraq on the labor 
force using several measures of the labor force: employment status, wages, hours worked per week 
and job performance. To do this, we use a nationwide household socio-economic survey conducted 
in 2007 by the Iraqi Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT), Kurdistan 
Regional Statistics Office (KRSO) and the World Bank. This data was only recently released and 
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thus is largely unexplored. Indeed, this paper is the first economic analysis that tries to study the 
effect of insurgent and sectarian violence on the Iraqi labor supply with micro-level data. 
3.3. Iraq Labor Market Characteristics  
Iraq is a country in the Middle East bordering the Persian Gulf. Neighboring countries 
include Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey. Iran has a strategic location on the 
Shatt al Arab waterway and at the head of the Persian Gulf. Two major rivers, the Tigris and 
Euphrates, run through the center of Iraq, flowing from northwest to southeast. The government 
system is a parliamentary democracy; the chief of state is the president, and the head of government 
is the prime minister. Iraq has a mixed economic system which includes some private freedom, 
combined with weak centralized economic planning and government regulation. Iraq is a member 
of the League of Arab States. 










Iraq, once a relatively skilled and economically prosperous society, has seen its 
development thwarted by decades of conflict and economic decline. Today it is an upper middle 
income, resource-rich, yet fragile and conflict-riven country.  With years of government instability 
68 
 
and a decade of war, Iraqi’s have had to suffer through harsh economic woes. With the lack of 
infrastructure and only the very beginnings of a stable government, the average Iraqi has been 
affected by the economy the most. In this section we highlight some facts about Iraq’s labor 
market.14  
Iraq's economy is well known to be heavily dependent on the oil sector. Oil exports 
traditionally generated about 95% of foreign revenues. Despite this domination, petroleum 
industries do not create many job opportunities. Job-seeking Iraqis are dependent on public sector 
employment, or smaller private industries for work. Given this labor market structure, Iraq has 
seen a high level of unemployment. For the last decade, Iraq’s unemployment has stayed 
alarmingly high. The year that saw the lowest year of unemployment occurred in 2014 when 
unemployment hit 15 percent. As of 2016, the unemployment in Iraq reached 16 percent.  
In tandem with the unemployment rate, Iraq has seen a relatively low level of participation 
in its labor force. Indeed, the participation rate has been dropping since 2003. In 2016, the labor 
force participation rate was around 46%. This does vary somewhat across the country, with data 
from 2011 showing Anbar, Najaf, and Wassit governorates as having the highest labor force 
participation (between 47 to 48 percent), and Dahuk, Thi-Qar, and Muthanna the lowest rates 
(between 37 to 40 percent).  
Noticeably, though, the participation rate for men and women has been moving in opposite 
directions. While men make up the majority of the workforce, the growth of women working has 
                                                 
14 It is should be noted that since 2003 Iraq economic statistic has been scarce to non-existent and there is some 
uncertainty regarding the labor market data. For this section we mainly depend on World Bank, International Labor 





been significant. This can be seen in Figure 3.2 , where the labor force participation rate for women 
in 1990 was around 5 percent, while it reached just over 14 percent in 2016.  
 
Figure 3.2  
Iraqi Female Labor Force Participation Rate  
 
 
Source: World Bank Database  
Much of the cause for the particularly low numbers in the 1990s can be attributed to strict 
restrictions placed on women in the workforce. Women were pushed out of the workforce in order 
to make more room for men, particularly in government positions. Some of those more significant 
restrictions were relaxed with the fall of the Ba’ath party in 2003, and we have seen the growth in 
women’s workforce participation. Data show that women in Iraq tend to find work in the 
agriculture and services sectors. This is in contrast to men who tend to find opportunities in 
construction and security. 
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While women’s participation is grown significantly in Iraq’s workforce, men’s 
participation has fallen slightly. Between 2002 and 2016, the male labor force participation rate 
dropped from 51% to 48%. This can be seen in Figure 3.3.  
Figure 3.3 










Source: World Bank Database  
Employment in the public sector represents approximately 42 percent of all jobs. Adding 
state-owned enterprise (SOE) employees would bring total employment in the public sector to 3.5 
million, close to one-half of all jobs in the country. Relatively high public-sector wages and job 
security make other alternatives appear undesirable, leading to subdued private sector job growth. 
In the public sector, the job distribution is highly affected by the conflict and security-related 
employment is large as a share of the total, out of 2.9 million public employees, 46 percent are 
employed in civilian ministries, 30 percent work for the defense and interior ministries (in both 
civilian and armed positions), and the remaining 24 percent were unclassified.  
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Like many of its Middle Eastern peers, Iraq has a demographic that skews young. 
According to the world bank, 56% of the Iraqi population is under 24 years of age, and the median 
age is a mere 21 years. While a large proportion of Iraq’s population today is children, in a few 
years, the country will be well-equipped with a sizable labor force that will face a dark future 
considering the economic struggle of the country. 78.5 percent of the population is literate, and the 
majority of Iraqis go through at least 10 years of schooling. However, only one out of every ten 
Iraqis has at least a diploma, and the likelihood of being unemployed or underemployed in the 
country increases substantially without a degree. 
Because the level of unemployment is high in the formal employment sector, many Iraqis 
are looking to develop skills that can help make them more competitive in the labor market. Often, 
Iraqis will look to the informal sector to try to develop skills that may help them find a job in the 
public or private sector. Indeed, it appears that informal employment will often fill the gaps where 
formal public and private employment cannot. Thus, the underground sector is a large employer 
of Iraqis and absorbs a good amount of the labor force. 
Labor laws in Iraq are in place to protect a worker’s rights to associate and bargain 
collectively, and prevent forced or compulsory labor, but these laws are seldom enforced. With the 
lack of formal employment opportunities and the prominence of unregulated and informal labor, 
many work conditions go unsupervised and fall below satisfactory standards. Half of employed 
Iraqis are unprotected, which means that they work without a contract, pension, and annual leave. 
In a survey conducted by the National Democratic Institute in 2012, jobs were rated as the Iraqi 





3.4. Conceptual Framework 
This section provides a conceptual framework which we use to derive several testable 
hypotheses. First, it is important to define the terrorism as it adopt in this analysis. We adopted the 
US State Department definition of terrorism, contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, 
Section 2656f(d). Accordingly, “The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, 
usually intended to influence an audience.” 
 Second, we explain the economic conceptual framework. Each individual in each Iraqi 
governorate faces some level of terrorism.  In each period, the individual chooses whether to 
supply labor or not, as measured either by the working variable we construct or by and allocation 
of productive capital. The individual gains wages and faces costs, in particular the endangerment 
costs imposed by terrorist activity.  Based on the above, we assume the labor supply under terrorist 
attacks follows a constrained maximization problem:  
      Max U(X) s.t. 
F=N + wT=pX + wL + wIc 
                 c < λ 
Here, U(X) is the individual’s utility function for consumption X. Let c denote the cost of 
endangerment from terrorism whenever hours of work are positive. N is non-labor income, p is 
the price of the consumption good X, w, the wage, is the implicit of leisure or commuting, I is an 
indicator function equal to 1 when c< λ and equal to 0 when c > λ and F is full income.  
If an agent from the individual chooses to work, they would undertake the cost of leisure 
and incur the endangerment cost from terrorism. If they choose not to work, or work less, they 
would gain more leisure time, but consumption would be lost. Thus, when maximizing utility, we 
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can think about the intersection of two indirect utility curves, one from each of the above scenarios. 
If the endangerment cost increases, the indirect utility curve for choosing to work would shift 
down. Thus, an increase in endangerment cost could induce agents to choose not to work. 
Additionally, by using comparative statics, we would expect that an increase in endangerment 
costs would decrease the number of hours spent working. This would have an impact on wages, 
and we would expect wages to fall in areas where endangerment costs are higher. As such, we 
develop the four following hypotheses:  
𝐻1𝑎: As endangerment costs increase, the marginal benefit of working decreases, so individuals 
choose to supply less labor. 
𝐻1𝑏: The number of hours worked is inversely correlated with endangerment costs. 
𝐻1𝑐: Individual wages will decrease as endangerment costs increase.  
𝐻1𝑑: Job permanence will decline as endangerment costs increase.  
3.5. Data and Statistical Summary  
The data on the labor force, demographic, economic, political and socioeconomic measures 
are constructed using the Iraq Household Socioeconomic survey. This survey, which is the first 
nationwide recently released household socio-economic survey, was conducted in 2007 by the 
Iraqi Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT), the Kurdistan Regional 
Statistics Office (KRSO) and the World Bank between Nov 2006 and Nov 2007. It contains data 
at the household and individual level in 2007 and has a total effective sample size of 17,822 
households. The data is divided into 56 strata where each governorate in Iraq comprises three 
sections: rural, urban and metropolitan. Only Baghdad is divided into three metropolitan strata. 




3.5.1. Dependent Variables  
Using the survey data, we constructed several measures of labor supply to look at mechanisms 
by which terrorist activity can distort labor market outcomes. First, we construct a binary measure 
captures the employment status of the survey respondent to reflect whether the respondent worked 
during any month of 2007. Then, conditioning on the employment status we measure the labor 
supply using the number of hours worked by the respondent in the past seven days, the amount of 
the last paycheck, which is a combined measure using the amount last paid in cash and the amount 
last paid in-kind and the job permanence the summary statistics for these variables are included 
below in Table (1.1).   
Table (3.1.1) 
Descriptive Statistics for Iraq Labor Supply measures 
Variables  observation Mean  Std. Dev.  
Worked during any month of 2007 vs. not  1,526,412 0.227 0.416 
Hours worked in past 7 days  127,307 13.2  30.63  
Job permanence: Work permanent job with 30 
hours a week vs. not  19,564 0.832 0.373 
Log of the amount of last paycheck: cash +in-
kind (1000 ID) 127,307 -5.30 0.680 
 
According to table (3.1.1), 22% of the survey respondent were employed at any month of 
2007. On average worked 13.2 hours a week and 83.2% of them working permanent job 
3.5.2. Main Regressors  
To measure the level of terrorism in a particular governorate, we use data from the Iraqi Body 
Count project (IBC). This data provides the number of terrorism incidents, which we use as a proxy 
for the terrorist attacks following the previous literature. IBC compiles these statistics using press 
reports to identify the incidents that kill non-combatants. They then document the number of deaths 
and this has become a widely-used measure which has been included in several papers that study 
conflict in Iraq (e.g. Berman et al. (2011)). Additionally, from the IBC, we use a variable for the 
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number of non-combatant fatalities in a single incident within each governorate. This allows for 
some proxy of severity of terrorism in particular regions that may have an impact on agent 
decision-making processes. We believe that 2007 is a significant year to study because it was a 
peak year for the level of terrorism. This can be seen in Figure 3.4 below.  
Figure 3.4 
Number of Terrorist Attacks by Month in Iraq  
 
Source: Iraqi Body Count Database 
The descriptive statistics for the main regressors are listed in Table (3.1.2). These show, for 
instance, that the number of terrorist incidents increased year-on-year from 2004 to 2007. The 
average is calculated across eighteen governorates and there is significant variation between 
governorates that experience more violence and governorates that experience less violent 
governorates.  The number of non-combatant Iraqi fatalities from terrorism attacks killed variable 
is also an average across the eighteen governorates. This variable takes the incident with the most 





 Descriptive Statistics for Main Regressors (Cross- Sectional Only) 
Dependent Variables  Observation   Mean  Std. Dev.  
Log of number of Terrorist Incidents in 2007  127,297  -4.81 2.10 
Log of number of Terrorist Incidents in 2006  127,297  -4.72 2.04 
Log of number of Terrorist Incidents in 2005  127,297  -3.99 1.81 
Log of number of Terrorist Incidents in 2004  127,297  -3.50 1.81 
Log of number of civilian fatalities in 2007  127,297  -4.97 2.24 
Log of number of civilian fatalities in 2006  127,297  -5.03 2.17 
Log of number of civilian fatalities in in 2005  127,297  -5.60 2.38 
Log of number of civilian fatalities in 2004  127,297  -5.86 2.13 
 
3.5.3. Control Factors  
  The control variables are taken from the Iraq Household Socioeconomic Survey, they are 
split into basic, socioeconomic, and political controls. The basic controls include: governorate, 
household size, age, sex, size of the governorate (taken from the Iraqi Census data of 2007) and 
marital status. The socioeconomic controls include: education which we proxy by the highest 
diploma attained, total household expenditure as proxy for poverty. In addition, we control for the 
migration effects using a variable that reflects whether the survey respondent born in governate x 
or not. Finally, we control for political affiliation using overall voter turnout for the Iraqi 2005 
parliament elections (taken from the ESOC – Iraq Civil War Dataset) These variables are 
summarized in Table (3.1.3).  
3.6. Econometric Framework   
In this section, we provide a justification for the use of the variables listed above. First, the 
variables are described below, with justifications for each, and then each dataset is considered, 






Descriptive Statistics for Control Factors 
Variable  N Mean  Std. Dev.  
Household size 127,307 9.00 4.49 
Sex 127,307 0.498 0.499 
Age 127,292 22.81 18.39 
Born in this governorate  127,291 1.06 0.245 
Marital status 84,908 1.63 0.908 
Economic sector 19,569 2.05 1.371 
Highest diploma attained 52,494 4.54 2.067 
Total expenditure (1,000 ID/ person/month) ( defl. Paasche) 125,748 126.9 77.8 
Percentage of voter turnout  127,307 76.7 9.84 
 
3.6.1. Dependent Variables (Labor Supply Measures)  
3.6.1.1.Cross-Sectional Survey Based  
The dependent variables include whether the individual responding to the survey was 
employed during 2007, the number of hours worked in the previous week, the job permanence of 
the respondent, and the amount of the last payment.  
We look at the labor market in a slightly different way than the previous literature onthat 
explore the conflict effects, using variables to examine the stability of the labor market, specifically 
hours worked per week, compensation, and job permanence. Here, our first variable is the hours 
worked during the past seven days. Because terrorism can cause disruptions in daily work patterns, 
this is an important measure of productivity shocks given that employees may not be able to get to 
work when terrorism is a more regular occurrence. To complement this measure, we also look at 
the amount of the last paycheck. In the survey data, in kind payments are a significant portion of 
the amount that is last paid to respondents, so we combine cash payments and in-kind payments to 
create a more complete measure of compensation.  
Because individual decisions are budget-constrained, the consumer problem is significantly  
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impacted by the amount of last compensation. Thus, we feel, from a theoretical perspective, that  
this particular measure of the labor market is an important indicator for disruptions caused by  
elevated levels of terrorism, and this is a particularly unique contribution to the literature.  
Conditioning on the employment status, the measure of job permanence allows this idea to be 
extended beyond the most recent employment level to look at decisions under a longer time 
horizon. This question asks respondents “How do you describe your work’s continuity (how long 
it will last)?” Given that the household likely plans over longer periods of time, the impact of 
terrorism on individual employment stability can be a significant indicator to understand the kinds 
of problems faced by the survey respondents.    
3.6.1.2.Panel-Survey Based  
Using the panel dataset, we constructed a binary variable to capture the employment status 
of the survey respondent where if the respondent indicated they worked in any month of 2007, the 
variable under consideration would receive a 1 and if they did not work in any month, the variable 
received a 0. For the panel dataset, we construct a time series for the 12 months of 2007. The 
variable used is the binary from the respondents whether they worked in January or not, whether 
they worked in February or not, and so forth. This is possible because each respondent is asked 
“During which months did you do this work during the last 12 months” and the respondent puts 
an “x” in each month in which they worked. Using the panel dataset, this allows us to examine 
how employment changes over time with a sequential measure of terrorist activity (i.e. number of 
terrorist attacks in each of those months).  
3.6.2. Explanatory Variables  
The main regressors we use proxy for the impact of terrorism on decisions made by the survey  
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respondents. First, we look at the number of terrorist attacks, and we take both a contemporaneous 
and a lagged approach, using the number of incidents from 2007 (the same year as the survey), as 
well as the number of terrorist incidents from 2004, 2005, and 2006. These variables are well 
established measures of terrorism in the literature and we believe that the number of terrorist 
attacks play a significant factor in the lives of individuals, given the increased coverage in the 
press, potential for greater financial damage, and disruption to daily life in areas where terrorism 
takes place. For both datasets, cross-sectional and panel, we extend the idea of the number of 
terrorist attacks to give a geographical weighting to each individual for the impact of terrorism on 
their governorate. This uses the governorate centroids to calculate the distance of each governorate 
to the terrorism of other governorates as a way to proxy potential spill-over effects that terrorism 
in one governorate may have on neighboring governorates.  
One of the more granular regressors looks at the event with the number of casualties across 
all events from the governorate, which mainly used for the robustness check of our finding under 
consideration. Thus, in this measure, for the cross-sectional dataset, one terrorist attack from each 
governorate provides the number of civilian fatalities in 2007. For the panel dataset, we take the 
event with the number of civilian fatalities for each month of 2007 by governorate. This 
complements the previous measure, the number of terrorist incidents, by creating a different 
approach to measuring impact of terrorism. Rather than frequency of terrorism we are able to look 
at the largest terrorist event, from a casualty perspective, and determine whether there is a 
distortion to labor market behavior. This variable also uses a contemporaneous and a lagged 





3.6.3. Controls Factors  
Our control variables are split into categories that are added to each model for the sake of 
robustness. We use individual and governorate characteristics, socioeconomic, and political 
indictors.  
The individual and governorate characteristics basically added to capture certain 
characteristics of the decision maker such as age, gender, marital status. Those characteristics have 
great influence on the individual decision of labor supply. Additionally, we control for 
governorate, household size, and whether the individual is a native citizen of the governorate she 
lives at during 2007.  This captures the internal migration effects. Socioeconomic controls include 
education attainment and poverty level. We proxy the education attainment of the decision maker 
by the highest diploma attended, this not only reflects the education level but also the year of 
schooling which both make a great effect on labor market. We also control for the economic sector. 
We to control for the poverty level using the total household expenditure. Finally, the political 
control includes the percentage of voter turnout to the Iraqi 2005 parliament election reflect the 
political engagement of the survey respondent.   
3.7. Econometric Analysis  
 To estimate the effect of the terrorism on the Iraqi labor market we estimate a cross-
sectional governorate level OLS estimator with the following:  
B. 𝑌𝑖𝐺 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖𝐺 + 𝛾
′𝑍𝑖𝐺 + 𝑖𝐺      (1.1) 
Where  
𝑌𝑖𝐺:  Labor market outcome of interest for individual 𝑖 in governorate 𝐺 
𝑋𝑖𝐺 : The set of explanatory variables represent different terrorism measures   
𝑍𝑖𝐺: The set of control factors 
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𝑖𝐺 : The error terms  
3.7.1. Estimation Techniques  
3.7.1.1. Cross-Sectional Survey  
The cross-sectional survey produces more dependent variables than the panel survey, and 
some of these must be treated differently. Here the outcome of interests includes: hours worked 
per week, last payment amounts, and job performance.  As both the hours worked per week and 
the last payment amount (combination of cash and in-kind) are continuous variables, we use a 
standard OLS estimation which provide a sufficient estimator for this kind of variables. While the 
Job permanence is a binary variable and so we are using a Probit model, as well as a linear 
probability model. In addition, we conduct marginal analysis to determine the magnitude of the 
effect.   
3.7.1.2. Panel Survey  
To examine the impact of terrorist activity on whether survey respondents were working over 
the 12 months of 2007, we employ several models. The first estimation we do is with a Pooled 
OLS (Linear Probability Model). Here, we use both fixed effects and random effects. Next, we use 
Given the binary nature of this dependent variable, we estimate a Probit model as we are interested 
in estimating the change of the binary variable from a 1 to a 0. For both the linear probability and 
Probit model we use fixed and random effects in addition to evaluate the economics importance 
of the coefficients using marginal analysis.  
3.7.1.3 Robustness Check   
To assess the robustness of our results, the empirical analysis uses four different regressor sets 
(i.e., models), which vary based on the inclusion of control factors. The first regressor set is the 
parsimonious model (Model 1), which excludes all control factors. The second set adds gender, 
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governorate, age and Marital status (Model 2). The third set adds socioeconomic variables (Model 
3). The full set includes all the control factors (Model 4). 
3.8. Econometrics Results 
     3.8.1. Cross-sectional results 
3.8.1.1. Hours Per Week   
Table 3.2.1 present the results of OLS estimations of the terrorist attacks effects on hours 
worked per week. Across all the different specifications (model (1) the parsimonious model to 
model (4) the full model) the results show significant effects that support the hypothesis that 
terrorism reduces labor supply. It worth mentioning that we log the dependent variable, hours 
worked per week, because the distribution is heavily skewed. All significant results indicate a 
negative relationship between terrorist activity and the logged number of hours worked per week, 
supporting our hypothesis that endangerment costs would cause households to work fewer hours.  
In order to check the results, we devise a robustness test to verify the impact of terrorism on the 
dependent variables. In addition to the number of terrorist incidents, we also look at the max 
number of civilian fatalities. The same results as shown in table 3.2.2 hold across the different 
specifications.  
In a measure related to the number of hours worked each week, we are able to look at the 
level of compensation respondents of the survey received on their last paycheck. Here, we have 
evidence that terrorism, measured by the log of terrorist incidents 2007, negatively impacts the 







OLS Estimation, Logged Number of Terrorist Incidents 2007 and Hours Worked 
per Week 2007 
Variables  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Log Terrorist Incidents, 2007 -0.947*** -0.0428 -0.325*** -0.437*** 
  (0.000) (0.160) (0.000) (0.000) 
Governorate   0.0247*** 0.104*** 0.0774*** 
    (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) 
Household Size    -0.0854*** 0.115*** 0.188*** 
    (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
Gender    21.29*** 17.30*** 15.94*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age   0.107*** -0.119*** -0.133*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Born here (governorate i)     0.0912 0.953* 1.033* 
    (0.689) (0.078) (0.065) 
Marital status   -3.065*** -1.045*** -1.124*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Economic Sector      -0.480*** -0.828*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
Highest diploma attained       -1.222*** 
        (0.000) 
Total expenditure        0.0151*** 
        (0.000) 
Voter turnout        -0.0739*** 
        (0.000) 
Observations 127,307 84,906 19,538 17,474 
R-squared 0.004 0.275 0.090 0.115 











Table (3.2.2)  
OLS Estimation, Civilian Fatalities and Hours Worked per Week 2007 
 
Variables  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Log Civilian Fatalities, 2007 -0.867*** 0.00189 0.00158 -0.142* 
  (0.000) (0.951) (0.982) (0.069) 
Governorate   0.0264*** 0.123*** 0.0762*** 
    (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) 
Household Size    
-
0.0866*** 0.106*** 0.169*** 
    (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) 
Gender    21.29*** 17.26*** 15.96*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age   0.108*** -0.116*** -0.130*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Born here (governorate i)     0.0802 0.820 0.880 
    (0.725) (0.129) (0.116) 
Marital status   -3.066*** -1.022*** -1.067*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Economic Sector      -0.458*** -0.793*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
Highest diploma attained       -1.163*** 
        (0.000) 
Total expenditure        0.0135*** 
        (0.000) 
Voter turnout        
-
0.0915*** 
Log Civilian Fatalities, 2007    (0.000) 
Observations 127,307 84,906 19,538 17,474 
R-squared 0.004 0.275 0.089 0.113 
Robust P-value in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. Compensation   
In a measure related to the number of hours worked each week, we are able to look at the 
level of compensation respondents of the survey received on their last paycheck. Here, we have 
evidence that terrorism, measured by the log of terrorist incidents 2007, negatively impacts the 
level of wages. This is shown in Table 2.3.1. 





OLS Estimation of the Effects of Terrorist Attacks 2007 on the Amount of Last 
Paycheck 
Variables  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Log Terrorist Incidents in 2007 -0.0206*** -0.0180*** -0.0225*** -0.0150*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Governorate   0.00768*** 0.0244*** 0.0113*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household Size    0.000682 0.00608*** -0.0203*** 
    (0.264) (0.010) (0.000) 
Gender    0.360*** 0.226*** -0.101*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age   -0.00344*** -0.0255*** -0.0234*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Born here (governorate i)     0.0202** 0.0144 0.0555* 
    (0.037) (0.641) (0.068) 
Marital status   0.00405* 0.117*** 0.0794*** 
    (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) 
Economic Sector      0.556*** 0.500*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
Highest diploma attained       -0.113*** 
        (0.000) 
Total expenditure        -0.00229*** 
        (0.000) 
Voter turnout        -0.0145*** 
    (0.002) 
Observations 127,307 84,906 19,538 17,474 
R-squared 0.004 0.275 0.089 0.113 
Robust P-value in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Again, using the robustness check to verify that terrorism does indeed negatively impact the 
amount of the last paycheck, we estimate the impact of civilian fatalities. This does show that the 








OLS Estimation, Number of Civilian Fatalities 2007 and Last Paycheck 2007 
Variables  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Log Civilian Fatalities, 2007 -0.0206*** -0.0180*** -0.0225*** -0.0150*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Governorate   0.00768*** 0.0244*** 0.0113*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household Size    0.000682 0.00608*** -0.0203*** 
    (0.264) (0.010) (0.000) 
Gender    0.360*** 0.226*** -0.101*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age   -0.00344*** -0.0255*** -0.0234*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Born here (governorate i)     0.0202** 0.0144 0.0555* 
    (0.037) (0.641) (0.068) 
Marital status   0.00405* 0.117*** 0.0794*** 
    (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) 
Economic Sector      0.556*** 0.500*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
Highest diploma attained       -0.113*** 
        (0.000) 
Total expenditure        -0.00229*** 
        (0.000) 
Voter turnout        -0.0145*** 
        (0.000) 
Observations 127,307 84,906 19,538 17,474 
R-squared 0.004 0.275 0.089 0.113 
Robust P-value in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3.8.1.3. Job Permanence   
       For the measure of job permanence, as discussed above, we construct an indicator that 
determines whether a survey respondent has a more stable employment position or a more transient  
one. In these results, correlation between the permanence of a job and terrorist activity is 






Table (3.4.1)  
Linear Probability Estimation, Number of Terrorist Incidents 2007, Job Permanence 2007 
Variables  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Log, Terrorist Incidents, 2007 -0.00486 -0.00423 -0.00587 -0.00363 
  (0.414) (0.495) (0.350) (0.512) 
Governorate   -0.000271 -0.000726 0.000352 
    (0.855) (0.629) (0.841) 
Household Size    -0.00217 -0.00201 0.00103 
    (0.279) (0.309) (0.683) 
Gender    -0.109*** -0.0465*** -0.00848 
    (0.000) (0.003) (0.508) 
Age   0.00343*** 0.00201*** 0.00156*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Born here (governorate i)     0.0177 0.0213* 0.0112 
    (0.169) (0.079) (0.428) 
Marital status   -0.0217*** -0.0120** -0.00548 
    (0.000) (0.017) (0.308) 
Economic Sector      -0.0668*** -0.0545*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
Highest diploma attained       0.0155*** 
        (0.000) 
Total expenditure        0.000310*** 
        (0.009) 
Voter turnout        0.000565 
        (0.530) 
Observations 127,307 84,906 19,538 17,474 
R-squared 0.004 0.275 0.089 0.113 













Linear Probability Estimation, Number of Civilian Fatalities 2007, Job Permanence 
2007. 
 
Variables  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Log number civilian fatalities, 2007 -0.00318 -0.00221 -0.00435 -0.00142 
  (0.623) (0.728) (0.509) (0.809) 
Governorate   -0.000112 -0.000553 0.000347 
    (0.940) (0.714) (0.844) 
Household Size    -0.00221 -0.00203 0.000897 
    (0.261) (0.295) (0.718) 
Gender    -0.109*** -0.0466*** -0.00832 
    (0.000) (0.003) (0.513) 
Age   0.00345*** 0.00202*** 0.00158*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Born here (governorate i)     0.0165 0.0199 0.0100 
    (0.201) (0.101) (0.478) 
Marital status   -0.0215*** -0.0119** -0.00504 
    (0.000) (0.018) (0.350) 
Economic Sector      -0.0668*** -0.0542*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
Highest diploma attained       0.0160*** 
        (0.000) 
Total expenditure        0.000298** 
        (0.011) 
Voter turnout        0.000430 
        (0.657) 
Observations 127,307 84,906 19,538 17,474 
R-squared 0.004 0.275 0.089 0.113 









Our results remain insignificant for this measure during the robustness check as well. One of the 
reasons for the lack of significant results may be in the construction of the dependent variable. 
Even when we run a Probit estimation the result hold the same.  
3.8.2. Panel Survey Results 
In our panel dataset, we only have one dependent variable: whether a survey respondent was 
working in each month of 2007. The result of table (5.1) show a strong support hypothesis H1 , as 
the results show a negative significance correlation between the employment status of the survey 
respondent and the terrorist incidents across all different specifications. 
3.9. Discussion 
The results presented above all use robust standard errors. We tried clustering on the 
governorate level, but this caused a loss of significance across all dependent variables and most 
levels of specification. In the Econometrics literature there is a discussion about the use of 
clustering when the number of clustered variables is small. We cluster on 18 governorates, so this 
approach may not be appropriate for our paper. Additionally, clustering is meant to be used when 
there is heteroskedasticity in the error terms. Yet, when we conduct a White test, it does not appear 
that we have such heteroskedasticity. With this in mind, it may be the case that reporting robust 
standard errors suffices.  
Our results, using robust standard errors, show significant and negative results. This is true 
across the dependent variables that we use in the cross-sectional and panel data, with the exception 
of Job Permanence in the cross-sectional data. Thus, if we reconsider our four hypotheses, we 





Table (3.5.1)  
Linear Probability Estimation, Number of Terrorist Incidents 2007, Working 2007 
Variables  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Log Terrorist Incidents, 
2007 -0.00427*** -0.00184*** -0.00685*** -0.00518*** 
  (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Governorate   0.000457*** 0.000894*** 0.000503** 
    (0.009) (0.000) (0.015) 
Household Size    -0.00452*** 0.000483 0.000607 
    (0.000) (0.175) (0.127) 
Gender    -0.450*** -0.0201*** -0.0234*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age   0.00347*** 0.00175*** 0.00148*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Born here (governorate i)     -0.0121** -0.00770 -0.00961* 
    (0.011) (0.146) (0.073) 
Marital status   -0.0751*** -0.00820*** -0.00444* 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.063) 
Economic Sector      -0.0136*** -0.0112*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
Highest diploma attained       0.00101 
        (0.159) 
Total expenditure        2.01e-05 
        (0.305) 
Voter turnout        
-
0.000799*** 
        (0.000) 
Observations 127,307 84,906 19,538 17,474 
R-squared 0.004 0.275 0.089 0.113 
Robust P-value in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
H1: As endangerment costs increase, the marginal benefit of working decreases, so households 
choose to supply less labor. 
H2: The number of hours worked is inversely correlated with endangerment costs. 
H3: Household wages will decrease as endangerment costs increase.  
H4: Job permanence will decline as endangerment costs increase.  
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The first three hypotheses are consistent with the results that we have presented here in this paper. 
However, the fourth hypothesis was not supported by the results that we have, both presented in 
this paper, and in other constructions of the job permanence variable.  
3.10. Conclusion  
Given the results discussed above, it is clear that terrorism increases endangerment costs for 
those participating in the labor force, and these elevated endangerment costs impact individual 
decision-making. As endangerment costs rise, proxied by the number of terrorist incidents and the 
maximum number of civilian fatalities, labor supply distortions result. There is evidence that 
individuals choose to not work when the endangerment costs reach a certain threshold. We also 
see that the number of hours worked per week decreases as endangerment costs increase, and that 
the amount of the household’s last paycheck declines.  
We believe that the approach presented here has significant implications for policymakers in 
two contexts. First, for policymakers in Iraq, these results should lead to specific types of 
interventions in areas particularly impacted by terrorism. We see that as endangerment costs rise, 
households choose not to work. However, the willingness to work increases, so there is a 
productivity gap. Technology could help bridge this gap by allowing people to work remotely or 
increasing security for transportation routes to business sectors in city neighborhoods.  
 The second set of policymakers that should find these results interesting are countries like 
the United States who face an influx of refugees from countries with high levels of conflict and 
violence. As endangerment costs in countries rise, an inevitable result is an influx of outward 
migration, often refugees seeking asylum in destination countries. Building on the results here, it 
would be interesting to understand both mitigation policies on endangerment costs, and the role of 
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destination countries in establishing national security policies to deal with the economic and 
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Appendix A  
Table A.1 
Pooled OLS Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within 5- Mile Radius on the 
Ratio of Facility Environmental Employees  








     
Median age  -0.00475*** -0.00281* -0.00294 -0.00326* 
 (0.000) (0.097) (0.102) (0.081) 
Black share of population -0.0103 0.0282 0.0316 0.0502** 
 (0.641) (0.223) (0.171) (0.034) 
Log of per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
0.193** 0.183*** 0.153*** 0.199*** 
 (0.020) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor's degree or higher 
0.704*** 0.629*** 0.646*** 0.739*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995 
0.0474 0.0930 0.150 0.172 
 (0.614) (0.359) (0.195) (0.155) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or 
over 
0.325** 0.238* 0.135 0.213* 
 (0.024) (0.051) (0.229) (0.081) 
Owner-occupied share of housing -0.0213 -0.0202 -0.0813 -0.0687 
 (0.673) (0.781) (0.356) (0.467) 
Share of population under poverty line -0.374** -0.363** -0.368** -0.464*** 
 (0.012) (0.021) (0.034) (0.010) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 724 724 709 709 
R-squared 0.071 0.169 0.203 0.233 

















Random Effects Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within 5- Mile Radius on 
the Ratio of Facility Environmental Employees  








     
Median age  -0.00470 -0.00276 -0.00277 -0.00259 
 (0.187) (0.457) (0.458) (0.487) 
Black share of population -0.0223 0.0145 0.0189 0.0177 
 (0.729) (0.828) (0.777) (0.791) 
Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
0.175* 0.152 0.120 0.133 
 (0.068) (0.147) (0.257) (0.209) 
Share of population aged 25 or 
over with bachelor's degree or 
higher 
0.649*** 0.557** 0.567** 0.610*** 
 (0.002) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) 
Share of population living in 
same house as 1995 
0.0395 0.0598 0.106 0.105 
 (0.801) (0.745) (0.569) (0.573) 
Male share of populations aged 
18 or over 
0.285 0.193 0.0937 0.119 
 (0.508) (0.649) (0.825) (0.779) 
Owner-occupied share of 
housing 
-0.0223 0.00481 -0.0437 -0.0243 
 (0.851) (0.973) (0.772) (0.872) 
Share of population under 
poverty line 
-0.339 -0.257 -0.252 -0.244 
 (0.282) (0.453) (0.474) (0.487) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 724 724 709 709 














Pooled OLS Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within 10- Mile Radius on the 
Ratio of Facility Environmental Employees  








     
Median age  -0.00596*** -0.00196 -0.000873 -0.000976 
 (0.000) (0.440) (0.741) (0.715) 
Black share of population -0.0912*** -0.0147 -0.0200 0.0104 
 (0.002) (0.561) (0.456) (0.723) 
Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
0.205** 0.193*** 0.122** 0.169*** 
 (0.028) (0.001) (0.030) (0.005) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor's degree or higher 
0.777*** 0.634*** 0.594*** 0.675*** 
 (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995 
0.118 0.132 0.162 0.171 
 (0.308) (0.344) (0.270) (0.260) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or 
over 
0.283 0.167 0.0866 0.202 
 (0.429) (0.580) (0.784) (0.530) 
Owner-occupied share of housing 0.00825 -0.0502 -0.0953 -0.0491 
 (0.895) (0.629) (0.416) (0.701) 
Share of population under poverty line -0.290* -0.389* -0.260 -0.370* 
 (0.072) (0.075) (0.253) (0.096) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 724 724 709 709 
R-squared 0.078 0.168 0.196 0.224 


















Random Effects Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within 10- Mile Radius on 
the Ratio of facility environmental employees  








     
Median age  -0.00645 -0.00241 -0.00138 -0.00113 
 (0.129) (0.598) (0.765) (0.807) 
Black share of population -0.106 -0.0333 -0.0365 -0.0378 
 (0.179) (0.691) (0.664) (0.652) 
Log Per household income 
(calendar year=1999, current $) 
0.195** 0.173 0.104 0.117 
 (0.046) (0.123) (0.366) (0.308) 
Share of population aged 25 or 
over with bachelor's degree or 
higher 
0.733*** 0.592** 0.549** 0.595** 
 (0.001) (0.013) (0.023) (0.014) 
Share of population living in same 
house as 1995 
0.112 0.0960 0.121 0.118 
 (0.538) (0.675) (0.600) (0.609) 
Male share of populations aged 18 
or over 
0.142 0.0625 -0.0173 0.00626 
 (0.852) (0.935) (0.982) (0.993) 
Owner-occupied share of housing 0.00116 -0.0282 -0.0635 -0.0416 
 (0.993) (0.862) (0.707) (0.806) 
Share of population under poverty 
line 
-0.289 -0.298 -0.179 -0.168 
 (0.442) (0.500) (0.689) (0.706) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 724 724 709 709 
















Pooled OLS Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within 15- Mile Radius on the 
Ratio of Facility environmental employees 








     
Median age  -0.00383 0.00201 0.00276 0.00158 
 (0.105) (0.602) (0.495) (0.690) 
Black share of population -0.125*** -0.0205 -0.0265 0.00648 
 (0.002) (0.597) (0.494) (0.877) 
Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
0.202** 0.145** 0.0735 0.134** 
 (0.042) (0.014) (0.270) (0.040) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor's degree or higher 
0.945*** 0.743*** 0.659*** 0.750*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995 
0.129 0.126 0.164 0.191 
 (0.301) (0.242) (0.183) (0.146) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over 1.178*** 1.048*** 0.960*** 1.054*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 
Owner-occupied share of housing 0.0487 -0.000281 -0.0515 -0.00548 
 (0.510) (0.998) (0.683) (0.969) 
Share of population under poverty line 0.0547 0.0625 0.142 -0.0167 
 (0.740) (0.788) (0.591) (0.947) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 724 724 709 709 
R-squared 0.094 0.177 0.201 0.226 


















Random Effects Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within 15- Mile Radius on 
the Ratio of facility environmental employees 








     
Median age  -0.00505 0.000998 0.00168 0.00155 
 (0.338) (0.866) (0.781) (0.797) 
Black share of population -0.143 -0.0375 -0.0423 -0.0444 
 (0.101) (0.694) (0.660) (0.645) 
Log Per household income 
(calendar year=1999, current $) 
0.201* 0.138 0.0678 0.0774 
 (0.057) (0.268) (0.598) (0.548) 
Share of population aged 25 or 
over with bachelor's degree or 
higher 
0.891*** 0.693*** 0.609** 0.628** 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.019) (0.016) 
Share of population living in same 
house as 1995 
0.127 0.0880 0.120 0.113 
 (0.520) (0.728) (0.644) (0.663) 
Male share of populations aged 18 
or over 
0.947 0.869 0.794 0.761 
 (0.241) (0.282) (0.329) (0.351) 
Owner-occupied share of housing 0.0270 0.00328 -0.0378 -0.0158 
 (0.855) (0.985) (0.836) (0.932) 
Share of population under poverty 
line 
0.0135 0.102 0.179 0.177 
 (0.975) (0.841) (0.726) (0.729) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 724 724 709 709 















Pooled OLS estimation of Local Community Characteristics within the distance between 5-
Mile radius and 10- Mile Radius on the Ratio of facility environmental employees 
 








     
Median age  -0.00151 -0.00339*** -0.00337*** -0.00347*** 
 (0.211) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Black share of population -0.0553* -0.0599** -0.0565** -0.0431 
 (0.059) (0.032) (0.049) (0.152) 
Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
-0.000207 -0.00172 -0.00284 -0.00297 
 (0.957) (0.672) (0.508) (0.529) 
Share of population aged 25 or 
over with bachelor's degree or 
higher 
-0.0177 -0.200 -0.180 -0.169 
 (0.827) (0.164) (0.169) (0.216) 
Share of population living in same 
house as 1995 
0.145** 0.0271 0.0273 0.0325 
 (0.014) (0.575) (0.594) (0.556) 
Male share of populations aged 18 
or over 
-0.276** -0.303** -0.419** -0.421** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.013) (0.015) 
Owner-occupied share of housing -0.0201 -0.106 -0.100 -0.104 
 (0.724) (0.190) (0.177) (0.166) 
Share of population under poverty 
line 
0.163* 0.0431 0.0568 0.0193 
 (0.061) (0.530) (0.412) (0.791) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 448 448 439 439 
R-squared 0.042 0.083 0.121 0.176 















Random Effects Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within the distance 
between 5-Mile radius and 10- Mile Radius on the Ratio of Facility Environmental 
Employees 








     
Median age  0.000726 -0.000189 0.000737 0.00117 
 (0.872) (0.969) (0.882) (0.815) 
Black share of population -0.0658 -0.0709 -0.0839 -0.0901 
 (0.433) (0.424) (0.345) (0.311) 
Log Per household income 
(calendar year=1999, current $) 
-0.00977 -0.00888 -0.0101 -0.0120 
 (0.164) (0.231) (0.181) (0.113) 
Share of population aged 25 or 
over with bachelor's degree or 
higher 
0.0142 0.0456 -0.00910 -0.0264 
 (0.941) (0.823) (0.965) (0.899) 
Share of population living in same 
house as 1995 
0.0893 0.0863 0.0509 0.00475 
 (0.725) (0.744) (0.848) (0.986) 
Male share of populations aged 18 
or over 
-0.539 -0.471 -0.494 -0.594 
 (0.189) (0.288) (0.271) (0.189) 
Owner-occupied share of housing 0.136 0.0862 0.0833 0.121 
 (0.457) (0.682) (0.692) (0.566) 
Share of population under poverty 
line 
0.563* 0.498 0.542 0.567 
 (0.076) (0.173) (0.143) (0.126) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 448 448 439 439 















Pooled OLS estimation of Local Community Characteristics within the distance between 
10-Mile radius and 15- Mile Radius on the Ratio of Facility Environmental Employees 
 








     
Median age  -0.00151 -0.00339*** -0.00337*** -0.00347*** 
 (0.211) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Black share of population -0.0553* -0.0599** -0.0565** -0.0431 
 (0.059) (0.032) (0.049) (0.152) 
Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
-0.000207 -0.00172 -0.00284 -0.00297 
 (0.957) (0.672) (0.508) (0.529) 
Share of population aged 25 or 
over with bachelor's degree or 
higher 
-0.0177 -0.200 -0.180 -0.169 
 (0.827) (0.164) (0.169) (0.216) 
Share of population living in same 
house as 1995 
0.145** 0.0271 0.0273 0.0325 
 (0.014) (0.575) (0.594) (0.556) 
Male share of populations aged 18 
or over 
-0.276** -0.303** -0.419** -0.421** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.013) (0.015) 
Owner-occupied share of housing -0.0201 -0.106 -0.100 -0.104 
 (0.724) (0.190) (0.177) (0.166) 
Share of population under poverty 
line 
0.163* 0.0431 0.0568 0.0193 
 (0.061) (0.530) (0.412) (0.791) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 458 458 449 449 
R-squared 0.032 0.265 0.281 0.315 














Random Effects Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within the Distance 
Between 10-Mile radius and 15- Mile Radius on the Ratio of Facility Environmental 
Employees 








     
Median age  0.0114 0.0121 0.0103 0.00753 
 (0.479) (0.427) (0.507) (0.630) 
Black share of population 0.178 0.198 0.113 0.124 
 (0.583) (0.505) (0.712) (0.686) 
Log Per household income 
(calendar year=1999, current $) 
-0.0214 -0.0158 -0.0166 -0.0156 
 (0.160) (0.281) (0.268) (0.299) 
Share of population aged 25 or 
over with bachelor's degree or 
higher 
-0.798 -0.560 -0.603 -0.623 
 (0.166) (0.322) (0.299) (0.285) 
Share of population living in same 
house as 1995 
0.293 0.256 0.426 0.453 
 (0.782) (0.796) (0.675) (0.656) 
Male share of populations aged 18 
or over 
-1.024 -0.497 -0.662 -0.910 
 (0.609) (0.791) (0.730) (0.637) 
Owner-occupied share of housing -0.367 -0.450 -0.575 -0.565 
 (0.586) (0.478) (0.373) (0.383) 
Share of population under poverty 
line 
0.180 -0.580 -0.530 -0.772 
 (0.901) (0.666) (0.697) (0.575) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 448 448 439 439 














Pooled OLS Estimation of Spatial Local Community Characteristics on Ratio of 
Environmental Employees 








Within 1-5-mile radius 
Median age  -0.00109 -0.00207 0.00165 -0.000382 
 (0.398) (0.146) (0.376) (0.838) 
Black share of population  0.000329 -0.0584 0.0103 -0.00908 
 (0.991) (0.157) (0.794) (0.860) 
Log of Per household income  0.0110*** 0.00957 0.00582 0.00176 
 (0.007) (0.241) (0.484) (0.839) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher  
0.0426 -0.0267 -0.0674 -0.162 
 (0.712) (0.910) (0.771) (0.538) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995  
0.0958 0.0175 0.192** 0.202** 
 (0.201) (0.820) (0.040) (0.049) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or 
over  
-0.206** -0.302*** -0.634*** -0.473* 
 (0.034) (0.006) (0.001) (0.053) 
Owner-occupied share of housing  0.00427 0.0270 -0.144 -0.143 
 (0.948) (0.725) (0.163) (0.169) 
Share of population under poverty line  -0.0185 0.101 0.0481 -0.0732 
 (0.810) (0.166) (0.476) (0.442) 
Within 5-10 miles radius 
Median age   -0.0117*** -0.0193*** -0.0404*** -0.0338*** 
 (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Black share of population  -0.296*** -0.204** -0.393*** -0.316*** 
 (0.002) (0.018) (0.000) (0.004) 
Log of Per household income  -
0.0309*** 
-0.0259*** -0.0513*** -0.0473*** 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher  
-0.252* 0.00330 -0.412* 0.0110 
 (0.087) (0.988) (0.054) (0.962) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995  
0.316 1.152*** 1.839*** 1.508** 
 (0.229) (0.009) (0.001) (0.029) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or 
over  
-2.282*** -1.057 -1.542* -1.682 
 (0.000) (0.174) (0.055) (0.121) 
Owner-occupied share of housing  -0.0919 -0.542** -0.764*** -0.349 
 (0.655) (0.018) (0.002) (0.329) 
Share of population under poverty line  0.746 -0.0238 0.434 0.758 
 (0.105) (0.960) (0.299) (0.131) 
112 
 
Within 10-15-mile radius  
Median age 0.0312*** 0.0384*** 0.0568*** 0.0385*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Black share of population  0.937*** 1.034*** 1.351*** 1.317*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log of Per household income  0.0145* 0.0293*** 0.0305*** 0.0263*** 
 (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher  
-0.0170 0.0217 0.230 -0.362 
 (0.957) (0.946) (0.429) (0.226) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995  
0.131 -0.507 -1.336*** -1.572*** 
 (0.749) (0.139) (0.004) (0.005) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or 
over  
0.109 -1.403 -0.184 -1.524 
 (0.903) (0.344) (0.905) (0.423) 
Owner-occupied share of housing  -0.0103 -0.0152 0.580* 0.0675 
 (0.969) (0.946) (0.071) (0.874) 
Share of population under poverty line  -2.520*** -3.074*** -2.817*** -4.107*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 72 72 70 70 
R-squared 0.408 0.551 0.676 0.789 
















Linear Probability Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within 5- Mile Radius 
on the Treatment Upgrade 








     
Median age  0.0126 0.0102 0.0110 0.00929 
 (0.351) (0.484) (0.456) (0.528) 
Black share of population 0.240 0.189 0.205 0.115 
 (0.290) (0.448) (0.427) (0.663) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
-0.381 -0.393 -0.277 -0.478 
 (0.316) (0.363) (0.532) (0.304) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
-1.185 -1.485 -1.479 -1.940** 
 (0.145) (0.101) (0.117) (0.046) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995 
-0.553 -0.637 -0.511 -0.645 
 (0.337) (0.351) (0.466) (0.367) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or 
over 
-0.532 -0.392 -0.296 -0.818 
 (0.726) (0.802) (0.851) (0.608) 
Owner-occupied share of housing 0.266 0.289 0.212 0.131 
 (0.535) (0.587) (0.711) (0.827) 
Share of population under poverty line  0.923 0.748 0.358 0.526 
 (0.425) (0.561) (0.790) (0.705) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 253 253 244 244 
R-squared 0.027 0.055 0.068 0.123 

















Linear Probability Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within 10- Mile Radius 
on the Treatment Upgrade 








     
Median age  0.0128 0.00548 0.00141 -0.00493 
 (0.447) (0.756) (0.936) (0.782) 
Black share of population 0.316 0.237 0.182 0.0524 
 (0.299) (0.486) (0.601) (0.882) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
-0.581 -0.650 -0.542 -0.702 
 (0.135) (0.131) (0.227) (0.130) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
-1.884** -2.324** -2.293** -2.692*** 
 (0.036) (0.011) (0.018) (0.006) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995 
-0.615 -0.425 -0.364 -0.431 
 (0.369) (0.620) (0.674) (0.621) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or 
over 
-0.764 -1.792 -2.391 -3.342 
 (0.805) (0.593) (0.478) (0.319) 
Owner-occupied share of housing 0.0294 -0.0617 -0.0641 -0.0853 
 (0.954) (0.921) (0.924) (0.905) 
Share of population under poverty line  0.628 -0.0274 -0.272 -0.335 
 (0.658) (0.987) (0.871) (0.845) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 253 253 244 244 
R-squared 0.030 0.065 0.077 0.137 
 
















Linear Probability Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within 15- Mile Radius 
on the Treatment Upgrade 








     
Median age  0.0241 0.0123 0.00616 0.00158 
 (0.279) (0.614) (0.802) (0.950) 
Black share of population 0.395 0.225 0.148 0.0120 
 (0.249) (0.571) (0.714) (0.977) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
-0.581 -0.565 -0.385 -0.546 
 (0.166) (0.240) (0.441) (0.313) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
-2.017** -2.116** -1.869* -2.200* 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.077) (0.052) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995 
-1.076 -0.843 -0.707 -0.885 
 (0.146) (0.381) (0.479) (0.384) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over -0.897 -1.032 -1.845 -2.321 
 (0.793) (0.782) (0.620) (0.548) 
Owner-occupied share of housing -0.266 -0.301 -0.355 -0.358 
 (0.646) (0.662) (0.630) (0.659) 
Share of population under poverty line  0.548 0.0814 -0.356 -0.139 
 (0.737) (0.967) (0.856) (0.945) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 253 253 244 244 
R-squared 0.030 0.057 0.064 0.120 











Probit Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within 5- Mile Radius on the 
Treatment Upgrade 








     
Median age  0.0335 0.0289 0.0313 0.0315 
 (0.355) (0.459) (0.431) (0.436) 
Black share of population 0.662 0.539 0.551 0.373 
 (0.300) (0.431) (0.431) (0.612) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
-0.984 -1.065 -0.783 -1.224 
 (0.308) (0.335) (0.488) (0.300) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
-3.054 -4.039* -4.086* -5.282** 
 (0.145) (0.086) (0.092) (0.038) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995 
-1.461 -1.777 -1.403 -1.778 
 (0.343) (0.337) (0.456) (0.360) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or 
over 
-1.310 -0.891 -0.655 -1.869 
 (0.758) (0.836) (0.879) (0.673) 
Owner-occupied share of housing 0.714 0.787 0.532 0.257 
 (0.530) (0.581) (0.725) (0.873) 
Share of population under poverty line  2.418 2.040 1.040 1.250 
 (0.432) (0.553) (0.772) (0.734) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 253 253 244 244 
 


















Probit Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within 10- Mile Radius on the 
Treatment Upgrade 








     
Median age  0.0336 0.0152 0.00451 -0.0131 
 (0.454) (0.751) (0.925) (0.790) 
Black share of population 0.835 0.642 0.457 0.112 
 (0.313) (0.476) (0.614) (0.906) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
-1.496 -1.767 -1.504 -1.801 
 (0.133) (0.116) (0.194) (0.141) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
-4.851** -6.357*** -6.341** -7.407*** 
 (0.038) (0.010) (0.013) (0.006) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995 
-1.606 -1.138 -0.959 -1.161 
 (0.381) (0.624) (0.682) (0.625) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over -1.991 -5.082 -6.705 -9.856 
 (0.804) (0.558) (0.439) (0.266) 
Owner-occupied share of housing 0.0950 -0.190 -0.232 -0.348 
 (0.943) (0.908) (0.894) (0.850) 
Share of population under poverty line  1.633 -0.200 -0.811 -1.457 
 (0.667) (0.964) (0.855) (0.749) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 253 253 244 244 
 


















Probit Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within 15- Mile Radius on the 
Treatment Upgrade 








     
Median age  0.0646 0.0338 0.0188 0.00282 
 (0.271) (0.596) (0.768) (0.966) 
Black share of population 1.056 0.603 0.366 -0.0152 
 (0.255) (0.563) (0.728) (0.989) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
-1.511 -1.528 -1.073 -1.269 
 (0.163) (0.222) (0.405) (0.361) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
-5.276** -5.810** -5.226* -6.058** 
 (0.032) (0.026) (0.057) (0.044) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995 
-2.912 -2.371 -2.046 -2.863 
 (0.147) (0.356) (0.439) (0.293) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or 
over 
-2.399 -3.094 -5.324 -7.944 
 (0.785) (0.744) (0.569) (0.419) 
Owner-occupied share of housing -0.697 -0.882 -1.047 -0.938 
 (0.646) (0.626) (0.581) (0.647) 
Share of population under poverty line  1.428 0.0174 -1.085 -1.079 
 (0.744) (0.997) (0.833) (0.840) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 253 253 244 244 
 
















Linear Probability Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within the Distance 
Between 5- Mile Radius and 10 Miles Radius on the Treatment Upgrade 








     
Median age  0.0196 0.0174 0.00563 -0.00292 
 (0.550) (0.616) (0.877) (0.939) 
Black share of population -0.163 0.239 0.274 0.301 
 (0.791) (0.715) (0.681) (0.673) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
0.0705* 0.0442 0.0381 0.0659 
 (0.075) (0.248) (0.357) (0.145) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
0.111 0.0576 -0.0654 0.985 
 (0.932) (0.966) (0.963) (0.557) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995 
-0.0970 1.007 0.854 1.425 
 (0.958) (0.587) (0.655) (0.472) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over 1.031 0.433 0.655 2.186 
 (0.732) (0.889) (0.838) (0.530) 
Owner-occupied share of housing -0.589 -0.275 -0.275 0.0276 
 (0.659) (0.853) (0.855) (0.986) 
Share of population under poverty line  -2.546 -2.257 -2.660 -2.686 
 (0.274) (0.385) (0.313) (0.337) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 159 159 153 153 
R-squared 0.025 0.128 0.130 0.212 


















Linear Probability Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within the Distance 
Between 10- Mile Radius and 15 Miles Radius on the Treatment Upgrade 








     
Median age  0.0285 0.0243 0.0381 0.0497 
 (0.596) (0.645) (0.470) (0.325) 
Black share of population 0.814 0.812 1.075 1.658 
 (0.469) (0.485) (0.377) (0.170) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
0.0412 0.0485 0.0579 0.0545 
 (0.469) (0.460) (0.391) (0.446) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
1.661 2.879 3.523 4.336* 
 (0.390) (0.180) (0.111) (0.062) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995 
-5.576 -4.205 -4.936 -5.437 
 (0.132) (0.288) (0.219) (0.212) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over 10.53* 9.886 11.55* 11.90* 
 (0.089) (0.130) (0.086) (0.079) 
Owner-occupied share of housing 1.313 2.070 2.848 3.486 
 (0.587) (0.424) (0.273) (0.195) 
Share of population under poverty line  0.697 2.247 2.487 4.068 
 (0.900) (0.691) (0.668) (0.486) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 162 162 157 157 
R-squared 0.043 0.098 0.144 0.242 


















Linear Probability Estimation of spatial constructed Local Community Characteristics 
effects on the Treatment Upgrade 
 








Within 1-5-mile radius 
Median age  0.00907 0.0110 -0.0184 -0.0267 
 (0.706) (0.686) (0.590) (0.516) 
Black share of population  -0.272 -0.606 -0.861 -0.900 
 (0.658) (0.384) (0.286) (0.340) 
Log of Per household income  0.00494 -0.144 -0.113 -0.180 
 (0.929) (0.196) (0.286) (0.150) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher  
-0.886 -4.200* -3.424 -4.333 
 (0.530) (0.061) (0.129) (0.126) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995  
-0.955 -1.311 -1.776 -2.308 
 (0.677) (0.545) (0.403) (0.306) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or 
over  
0.186 -1.193 -0.0133 0.192 
 (0.932) (0.657) (0.996) (0.954) 
Owner-occupied share of housing  -1.940 -2.383 -1.110 0.910 
 (0.210) (0.127) (0.510) (0.649) 
Share of population under poverty line  -1.581 -0.606 -0.596 0.714 
 (0.175) (0.655) (0.662) (0.704) 
Within 5-10 miles radius 
Median age   0.0697 0.0263 0.0754 0.138 
 (0.347) (0.757) (0.479) (0.334) 
Black share of population  2.143 4.595** 5.005*** 2.431 
 (0.167) (0.011) (0.005) (0.268) 
Log of Per household income  0.0264 0.0721 0.119 0.257 
 (0.869) (0.681) (0.548) (0.196) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher  
-2.094 2.717 4.590 8.486 
 (0.457) (0.440) (0.224) (0.136) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995  
0.355 9.750* 3.818 -0.0137 
 (0.930) (0.051) (0.493) (0.999) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or 
over  
14.01 30.90** 28.47** 11.04 
 (0.207) (0.016) (0.012) (0.444) 
Owner-occupied share of housing  0.809 0.284 1.242 6.554 
 (0.738) (0.923) (0.666) (0.143) 
Share of population under poverty line  -5.130 -5.569 -5.672 -1.569 
 (0.423) (0.464) (0.417) (0.852) 
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Within 10-15-mile radius  
Median age -0.0273 -0.128 -0.187 -0.410* 
 (0.839) (0.402) (0.282) (0.088) 
Black share of population  -1.972 -4.814 -6.774* -1.774 
 (0.490) (0.250) (0.084) (0.718) 
Log of Per household income  -0.0689 0.0801 0.0459 -0.144 
 (0.545) (0.562) (0.744) (0.365) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher  
0.274 0.0380 0.179 -10.16* 
 (0.940) (0.993) (0.970) (0.094) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995  
-17.14*** -24.51*** -19.12** -18.29* 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.023) (0.094) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or 
over  
10.60 -1.290 12.36 4.273 
 (0.413) (0.949) (0.479) (0.834) 
Owner-occupied share of housing  4.654 9.845** 5.823 -0.897 
 (0.249) (0.026) (0.204) (0.885) 
Share of population under poverty line  16.33 19.80 23.16 8.358 
 (0.176) (0.240) (0.112) (0.672) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 72 72 70 70 
R-squared 0.408 0.551 0.676 0.789 
















Probit Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within the distance between 5- Mile 
Radius and 10 Miles Radius on the Treatment Upgrade 








     
Median age  0.0576 0.0522 0.0164 0.00760 
 (0.510) (0.585) (0.870) (0.941) 
Black share of population -0.426 0.577 0.657 0.153 
 (0.794) (0.742) (0.709) (0.939) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
0.215* 0.161 0.134 0.269* 
 (0.100) (0.253) (0.346) (0.096) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
0.517 0.315 -0.292 2.240 
 (0.887) (0.936) (0.942) (0.635) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995 
-0.482 2.930 2.475 4.343 
 (0.922) (0.563) (0.628) (0.425) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or 
over 
2.936 1.269 1.972 7.178 
 (0.716) (0.881) (0.819) (0.492) 
Owner-occupied share of housing -1.594 -0.765 -0.773 0.167 
 (0.652) (0.855) (0.853) (0.971) 
Share of population under poverty line  -7.280 -6.916 -8.509 -10.30 
 (0.255) (0.358) (0.276) (0.226) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions(*)  No No No Yes 
Observations 159 157 151 151 
 

















Probit Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within the distance between 10- 
Mile Radius and 15 Miles Radius on the Treatment Upgrade 








 0.0676 0.0496 0.0973 0.155 
Median age  (0.646) (0.745) (0.530) (0.386) 
 2.195 2.323 3.247 8.861** 
Black share of population (0.472) (0.450) (0.317) (0.014) 
 0.105 0.121 0.145 0.0635 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
(0.484) (0.480) (0.421) (0.751) 
 4.762 7.869 9.911 12.84* 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
(0.386) (0.188) (0.116) (0.064) 
 -14.32 -11.16 -13.72 -29.26** 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995 
(0.151) (0.282) (0.194) (0.021) 
 29.65* 27.95 33.96* 43.48** 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over (0.098) (0.136) (0.082) (0.043) 
 3.190 5.187 7.379 15.07** 
Owner-occupied share of housing (0.621) (0.446) (0.279) (0.049) 
 2.057 5.855 6.323 13.37 
Share of population under poverty line  (0.885) (0.686) (0.671) (0.420) 
     
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 162 162 157 155 
 















Linear Probability Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within 5- Mile Radius 
on the Extent of Environmental Training 








     
Median age  -0.00973* -0.00903 -0.0119** -0.0115* 
 (0.052) (0.112) (0.044) (0.059) 
Black share of population 0.0580 0.0341 0.0439 0.0528 
 (0.638) (0.793) (0.738) (0.700) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
0.388** 0.501** 0.615** 0.577** 
 (0.039) (0.030) (0.015) (0.022) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
-0.0108 0.244 0.374 0.353 
 (0.977) (0.574) (0.421) (0.463) 
Share of population living in same house as 
1995 
-0.0610 0.244 0.402 0.423 
 (0.850) (0.555) (0.338) (0.327) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over -0.567 -0.666 -0.703 -0.735 
 (0.620) (0.591) (0.566) (0.557) 
Owner-occupied share of housing -0.101 -0.348 -0.534 -0.551 
 (0.732) (0.345) (0.164) (0.152) 
Share of population under poverty line  -1.270* -1.902** -2.452*** -2.432*** 
 (0.056) (0.018) (0.004) (0.006) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 72 72 70 70 
R-squared 0.408 0.551 0.676 0.789 

















Linear Probability Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within 10- Mile Radius 
on the Extent of Environmental Training 








     
Median age  -0.00719 -0.00697 -0.0103 -0.00915 
 (0.189) (0.281) (0.152) (0.220) 
Black share of population 0.0441 0.0544 0.0236 0.0365 
 (0.801) (0.771) (0.898) (0.851) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
0.423** 0.616*** 0.726*** 0.683*** 
 (0.031) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
0.516 0.745* 0.924** 0.908* 
 (0.199) (0.081) (0.048) (0.056) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995 
-0.133 0.259 0.351 0.412 
 (0.745) (0.627) (0.524) (0.458) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over 1.134 0.842 0.807 0.745 
 (0.402) (0.592) (0.613) (0.656) 
Owner-occupied share of housing 0.0826 -0.212 -0.298 -0.370 
 (0.814) (0.611) (0.501) (0.407) 
Share of population under poverty line  -0.759 -1.857* -2.144** -2.144** 
 (0.371) (0.063) (0.038) (0.039) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 72 72 70 70 
R-squared 0.408 0.551 0.676 0.789 


















Linear Probability Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within 15- Mile Radius 
on the Extent of Environmental Training 








     
Median age  -0.00556 -0.00759 -0.0128 -0.0110 
 (0.436) (0.392) (0.224) (0.317) 
Black share of population -0.0358 -0.0667 -0.109 -0.104 
 (0.860) (0.776) (0.650) (0.682) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
0.402* 0.594** 0.741** 0.684** 
 (0.060) (0.026) (0.017) (0.029) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
0.554 0.782* 1.067** 1.081* 
 (0.209) (0.085) (0.049) (0.056) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995 
-0.0823 0.207 0.362 0.481 
 (0.850) (0.722) (0.560) (0.461) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or 
over 
2.153* 1.933 1.863 2.196 
 (0.085) (0.159) (0.182) (0.150) 
Owner-occupied share of housing 0.0310 -0.189 -0.265 -0.389 
 (0.941) (0.678) (0.581) (0.429) 
Share of population under poverty line  -0.205 -1.093 -1.460 -1.330 
 (0.830) (0.332) (0.217) (0.270) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 72 72 70 70 
R-squared 0.408 0.551 0.676 0.789 

















Linear Probability Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within the distance 
between 5-Mile radius and 10- Mile Radius on the Extent of Environmental Training 








     
Median age  -0.00551 -0.0130 -0.0145 -0.0144 
 (0.621) (0.310) (0.286) (0.278) 
Black share of population -0.321 -0.259 -0.303 -0.267 
 (0.297) (0.420) (0.354) (0.459) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
0.00320 -0.00193 -0.00701 -0.00489 
 (0.709) (0.867) (0.590) (0.742) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
0.347 0.148 0.125 0.220 
 (0.397) (0.768) (0.817) (0.737) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995 
-0.528 -0.114 -0.235 -0.266 
 (0.458) (0.860) (0.730) (0.737) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over -0.396 -0.372 -0.331 -0.345 
 (0.685) (0.659) (0.708) (0.760) 
Owner-occupied share of housing 0.501 0.514 0.579 0.655 
 (0.190) (0.248) (0.217) (0.190) 
Share of population under poverty line  2.222** 2.343** 2.825** 2.897** 
 (0.024) (0.035) (0.022) (0.034) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 72 72 70 70 
R-squared 0.408 0.551 0.676 0.789 



















Linear Probability Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within the distance 
between 10-Mile radius and 15- Mile Radius on the Extent of Environmental Training 








     
Median age  0.0192 0.0192 0.0260 0.0294 
 (0.167) (0.289) (0.180) (0.158) 
Black share of population -0.597 -0.589 -0.465 -0.582 
 (0.203) (0.264) (0.399) (0.342) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
-0.00134 0.00348 -0.000419 -0.00266 
 (0.955) (0.893) (0.988) (0.935) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
-0.542 -0.0616 -0.209 -0.159 
 (0.557) (0.957) (0.856) (0.909) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995 
0.160 0.531 0.330 0.585 
 (0.901) (0.714) (0.823) (0.718) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or 
over 
4.831 4.848 5.267 5.830 
 (0.150) (0.205) (0.177) (0.197) 
Owner-occupied share of housing -0.606 -0.0569 -0.0441 -0.115 
 (0.506) (0.955) (0.966) (0.921) 
Share of population under poverty line  3.567 4.662 4.202 4.782 
 (0.201) (0.127) (0.162) (0.170) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 72 72 70 70 
R-squared 0.408 0.551 0.676 0.789 
















Linear Probability Estimation of Spatial Local Community Characteristics on the Extent 
of Environmental Training 
 








Within 1-5-mile radius 
Median age  0.00580 0.00857 0.00734 -0.0116 
 (0.630) (0.530) (0.653) (0.698) 
Black share of population  0.176 0.250 0.283 0.0870 
 (0.368) (0.432) (0.436) (0.891) 
Log of Per household income  0.0181 -0.0205 -0.0227 -0.00927 
 (0.623) (0.662) (0.703) (0.912) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher  
0.811 -0.374 -0.415 -0.959 
 (0.256) (0.766) (0.767) (0.611) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995  
-0.503 -0.577 -0.605 -1.310 
 (0.455) (0.586) (0.590) (0.361) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over  0.160 -0.0187 -0.0287 0.945 
 (0.665) (0.982) (0.981) (0.691) 
Owner-occupied share of housing  0.457 0.437 0.518 1.161 
 (0.490) (0.470) (0.470) (0.388) 
Share of population under poverty line  0.0202 0.209 0.208 0.324 
 (0.969) (0.726) (0.764) (0.847) 
Within 5-10 miles radius 
Median age   -0.0304 -0.0475 -0.0533 0.00586 
 (0.192) (0.225) (0.363) (0.952) 
Black share of population  -0.976 -0.635 -0.732 -0.156 
 (0.177) (0.494) (0.551) (0.929) 
Log of Per household income  0.00308 -0.0356 -0.0392 -0.0776 
 (0.938) (0.664) (0.675) (0.573) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher  
1.247 0.821 1.054 -1.636 
 (0.264) (0.553) (0.536) (0.521) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995  
1.104 2.919 2.677 0.288 
 (0.467) (0.264) (0.303) (0.960) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over  2.245 3.571 2.558 3.277 
 (0.600) (0.456) (0.655) (0.776) 
Owner-occupied share of housing  1.736 2.176 2.450 2.236 
 (0.322) (0.280) (0.282) (0.413) 
Share of population under poverty line  0.746 -0.0238 0.434 0.758 
 (0.105) (0.960) (0.299) (0.131) 
Within 10-15-mile radius  
Median age 0.0684 0.0527 0.0483 0.00833 
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 (0.178) (0.494) (0.630) (0.956) 
Black share of population  0.629 0.556 0.581 0.935 
 (0.506) (0.745) (0.774) (0.764) 
Log of Per household income  0.00485 0.0345 0.0298 0.0216 
 (0.901) (0.492) (0.597) (0.811) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher  
-1.076 -0.459 -0.662 -1.832 
 (0.534) (0.828) (0.767) (0.566) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995  
-0.144 -2.008 -1.729 3.600 
 (0.931) (0.391) (0.546) (0.514) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over  -0.514 -4.451 -2.845 -0.917 
 (0.895) (0.450) (0.694) (0.937) 
Owner-occupied share of housing  -1.803 1.621 1.331 -1.046 
 (0.227) (0.438) (0.574) (0.808) 
Share of population under poverty line  -4.788 -4.173 -4.293 -11.94 
 (0.270) (0.413) (0.462) (0.280) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 72 72 70 70 
R-squared 0.408 0.551 0.676 0.789 
 















Probit Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within the distance between 5- Mile 
Radius and 10 Miles Radius on the Extent of Environmental Training 








     
Median age  -0.0532 -0.134 -0.171 -0.151 
 (0.678) (0.422) (0.351) (0.449) 
Black share of population -4.454 -1.560 -0.509 2.001 
 (0.151) (0.613) (0.852) (0.580) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
0.104 0.0882 0.0341 0.199 
 (0.488) (0.682) (0.879) (0.494) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
7.484 6.565 9.015 14.81* 
 (0.163) (0.267) (0.245) (0.099) 
Share of population living in same house as 
1995 
-7.756 -3.667 -5.177 -9.629 
 (0.264) (0.598) (0.434) (0.216) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over -2.810 -5.799 -1.580 8.101 
 (0.788) (0.604) (0.867) (0.574) 
Owner-occupied share of housing 8.079** 9.683* 10.95* 14.20** 
 (0.011) (0.078) (0.067) (0.050) 
Share of population under poverty line  27.95*** 29.40** 33.55*** 39.52**
* 
 (0.000) (0.017) (0.005) (0.006) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions(*)  No No No Yes 
Observations 159 157 151 151 
 



















Probit Estimation of Local Community Characteristics within the distance between 10- 
Mile Radius and 15 Miles Radius on the Extent of Environmental Training 








     
Median age  0.168 0.234 0.525 0.927* 
 (0.168) (0.199) (0.125) (0.092) 
Black share of population -7.205 -8.307 -8.347 -22.13* 
 (0.167) (0.163) (0.353) (0.089) 
Log of Per household income (calendar 
year=1999, current $) 
0.0997 0.0927 0.101 0.550 
 (0.716) (0.757) (0.777) (0.300) 
Share of population aged 25 or over with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
1.231 6.012 14.08 37.35* 
 (0.850) (0.491) (0.211) (0.071) 
Share of population living in same house 
as 1995 
4.731 3.994 10.34 30.52 
 (0.729) (0.801) (0.610) (0.295) 
Male share of populations aged 18 or over 44.84 54.31* 77.84** 124.9* 
 (0.157) (0.077) (0.025) (0.054) 
Owner-occupied share of housing -3.663 7.133 6.077 6.346 
 (0.662) (0.472) (0.611) (0.718) 
Share of population under poverty line  35.16 63.91** 80.36* 142.9** 
 (0.160) (0.026) (0.056) (0.030) 
Contral factors Included  
Region and Year indictors  No Yes Yes Yes 
Facility Charactristics  No No Yes Yes 
Regulation and Inspestions  No No No Yes 
Observations 162 162 157 155 
 
Robust P-value in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
